All with an interest in EU policymaking must take note of current developments in Austria where the leader of the far-right Freedom Party FPÖ Herbert Kickl was given the task of forming a new government by the Austrian President Alexander Van der Bellen on Monday last. This followed the breakdown of government negotiations between the conservative, liberal and centre-left parties and the resignation of the former leader of the conservative ÖVP Karl Nehammer at the weekend.
Kickl is no stranger to the Austrian government. He previously served as Interior Minister between 2017 and 2019 when the Freedom Party was the junior party in a coalition with the ÖVP led by Chancellor Sebastian Kurz. At the time Austria faced punitive measures from other EU member states for admitting a party founded by former Nazis into government. Now the new leader of the ÖVP, Christian Stocker, has indicated that he is open to talking with the Freedom Party. This opens the prospect of Kickl becoming the next Austrian Chancellor with a seat at the European Council, though this will depend on a successful outcome of government negotiations between the two parties.
This Austrian outcome, the result of the FPÖ emerging as the largest party in the recent general election, mirrors a trend in other countries where far-right political parties have steadily increased their support. In trying to predict the consequences of this trend for future European policymaking, most commentators focus on the composition of the European Parliament after the June 2024 election. There has been a lot of focus on the rightward shift in the Parliament with the EPP political group gaining strength but also the far-right European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), Patriots for Europe (PfE) and Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN) political groups gaining seats, and what this might mean for future support for Commission proposals.
In my view, this overlooks the equally important role of the Council of Ministers, and also the European Council. Here, changes in the composition of the Council take place more gradually depending on the rhythm of national elections. But the shift is equally unmistakable. Far right parties now take part in governments in Croatia, Czechia, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Slovakia and Sweden (where the Swedish Democrats though not formally in government support it through a confidence and supply arrangement), and lead the governments in Czechia, Hungary, Italy and Slovakia. They have been in power in Poland and may well take part in government in Germany and France in the near future.
In the following table I summarise the support for far-right parties in each member state. I have defined far-right parties as those affiliated with the three political groups in the European Parliament ECR, PfE and ESN. I have generally not included other political parties affiliated with these groups that stood in national elections but did not gain seats in national parliaments unless subsequent opinion polls show them gaining significant support.
For each group, I have listed the share of votes gained in the last general election, and the share of votes reported by the most recent opinion polls (generally taken in the period October through December 2024). Although there are many exceptions, the listed parties have generally increased their voting support over time.
Country |
Party Name |
Vote Share last election (%) |
Election Date |
Polling end-2024* |
In Government |
Leader is Prime Minister |
Member of ECR, Patriots, or ESN |
Austria |
Freedom Party (FPÖ) |
28.8 |
Sep 2024 |
36.0 |
In formation |
In formation |
Patriots |
Belgium |
Vlaams Belang (VB) |
13.8 |
Jun 2024 |
– |
In formation |
In formation |
Patriots |
New Flemish Alliance (NVA) |
16.7 |
– |
In formation |
In formation |
ECR |
||
Bulgaria |
Revival (Vazrazhdane) |
12.9 |
Oct 2024 |
15.0 |
In formation |
In formation |
ESN |
There is such a people |
6.7 |
6.0 |
In formation |
In formation |
ECR |
||
Croatia |
Homeland Movement (DP) |
10.9 |
Apr 2024 |
3.3 |
Yes |
No |
ECR |
Most – Croatian |
8.0 |
8.0 |
No |
No |
ECR |
||
Cyprus |
National Popular Front |
6.8 |
May 2021 |
14.4 |
No |
No |
ECR |
Czechia |
ANO 2011 |
27.1 |
Oct 2021 |
33.0 |
Yes |
No |
Patriots |
Civic Democratic Party |
27.8 |
12.6 |
Yes |
Yes |
ECR |
||
Freedom and Direct |
9.6 |
7.9 |
No |
No |
ESN |
||
Denmark |
Danish People’s Party |
2.6 |
Nov 2022 |
5.0 |
No |
No |
Patriots |
Denmark Democrats |
8.1 |
10.0 |
No |
No |
ECR |
||
Estonia |
Conservative People’s Party |
16.1 |
Mar 2023 |
14.0 |
No |
No |
Patriots |
Centre Party |
15.3 |
14.0 |
No |
No |
ECR |
||
Finland |
Finns Party |
20.1 |
Apr 2023 |
15.0 |
Yes |
No |
ECR |
France |
National Rally (RN) |
33.0/37.0 |
Jun/Jul 2024 |
34.0 |
No |
No |
Patriots |
Germany |
Alternative for Germany |
10.4 |
Sep 2021 |
20.0 |
No |
No |
ESN |
Greece |
Voice of Reason |
0.4 |
Jun 2023 |
6.0 |
No |
No |
Patriots |
Hungary |
Fidesz |
52.5 |
Apr 2022 |
41.6 |
Yes |
Yes |
Patriots |
Our Homeland Movement (Mi |
5.9 |
6.0 |
No |
No |
ESN |
||
Italy |
Brothers of Italy (FdI) |
26.0 |
Sep 2022 |
28.0 |
Yes |
Yes |
ECR |
Lega |
8.8 |
8.0 |
Yes |
No |
Patriots |
||
Latvia |
National Alliance |
9.4 |
Oct 2022 |
17.0 |
No |
No |
ECR |
Latvia First |
6.3 |
14.6 |
No |
No |
Patriots |
||
Farmers and Greens |
7.2 |
9.2 |
Yes |
No |
ECR |
||
Lithuania |
Dawn of Nemunas |
15.3 |
Oct 2024 |
– |
Yes |
No |
– |
Electoral Action of Poles |
4.0 |
2.8 |
No |
No |
ECR |
||
National Alliance |
2.9 |
1.7 |
No |
No |
ECR |
||
People and Justice Union |
1.4 |
– |
No |
No |
ESN |
||
Luxembourg |
Alternative Democratic |
9.3 |
Oct 2023 |
6.9 |
No |
No |
ECR |
Netherlands |
Party for Freedom (PVV) |
23.5 |
Nov 2023 |
24.0 |
Yes |
No |
Patriots |
Poland |
Law and Justice (PiS) |
29.1 |
Oct 2023 |
32.0 |
No |
No |
ECR |
Confederation (National |
7.2 |
14.0 |
No |
No |
Patriots/ |
||
Portugal |
Chega |
18.1 |
Jan 2022 |
18.0 |
No |
No |
Patriots |
Romania |
Alliance for the Union of |
18.0 |
Dec 2024 |
20.0 |
No |
No |
ECR |
S.O.S. Romania |
7.8 |
– |
No |
No |
ESN* |
||
Party of Young People |
6.5 |
– |
No |
No |
ESN? |
||
Slovakia |
Direction – Social |
23.0 |
Sep 2023 |
20.0 |
Yes |
Yes |
NI |
Freedom and Solidarity |
6.3 |
6.0 |
No |
No |
ECR |
||
Slovak National Party (SNS) |
5.6 |
4.0 |
Yes |
No |
Patriots |
||
Republic Movement |
4.8 |
8.0 |
No |
No |
ESN |
||
We are Family (SME Rodina) |
2.2 |
3.0 |
No |
No |
Patriots |
||
Slovenia |
Slovenian Democratic Party |
23.5 |
Apr 2022 |
32.8 |
No |
No |
ECR |
Slovenian National Party |
1.5 |
1.9 |
No |
No |
Patriots |
||
Spain |
Vox |
15.1 |
Jul 2023 |
14.0 |
No |
No |
Patriots |
Sweden |
Sweden Democrats (SD) |
20.5 |
Sep 2022 |
21.0 |
Confidence and supply |
No |
ECR |
Sources: Own compilation. Information as of the date of this post. Vote shares in most recent election taken from the relevant country Wikipedia pages. Most recent polling data taken from the Europe Elects website, which also provides information on affiliation with the European political parties. “In Government” indicates whether the party is part of the ruling coalition or holds significant governmental positions. “Leader is Prime Minister” denotes if the party’s leader currently serves as the head of government.
Notes: * The latest opinion polling data varies between October and December 2024 depending on country. In some cases the election result refers to an election grouping with other parties which distorts the comparison with the opinion poll data. Dawn of Nemunas in Lithuania is included as it is a recently-established party with a clear far-right agenda but has not yet indicated which European political party it might affiliate with. Ireland and Malta are the only two Member States where far-right parties have no representation.
If anyone notices an error in this table, please let me know and I will be happy to correct it.
In general, far-right parties are distinguished by being Eurosceptic, anti-immigrant, climate-sceptic, with authoritarian or illiberal views on the the separation of powers within a state and the expression of dissent, and with conservative values around family and identity issues. These views distinguish them from centre-right parties who in general are supportive of EU integration and of democratic standards, though they may also express reservations on immigration and climate policy and support conservative values. It is also the case that far-right parties hold different views from each other on some of these issues, as is reflected in the fact that there are three European political groups and not a single unified grouping. Some but not all are pro-Russia in their views, and thus hostile to providing support to Ukraine, while others such as the Czech Civic Democratic Party and the Italian Brothers of Italy have been strong supporters.
There are also several conservative far-left parties who share these values but take a more class-based view on economic matters such as redistribution. Examples would be SMER in Slovakia (which was expelled from the S&D political group following its decision to form a coalition government with the far-right Slovak National Party SNS, but which refused to join the Patriots for Europe grouping because “it had nothing to do with the left or social democracy”) or the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance in Germany. On many policy issues it would be appropriate to include them with the far-right parties listed in the table.
My interest is in the implications of the growing representation of far-right parties in national governments for the position that Ministers will take in the Council of Ministers on agricultural, trade and enlargement issues. How will it affect national attitudes to the negotiations on the next EU budget and in particular spending on the CAP? How will it affect member states’ willingness to ratify trade agreements such as Mercosur? How will it affect the EU’s attitude to further enlargement? What will it mean for the Green Deal? How will it impact on the level of ambition for the EU’s climate target in 2040? To answer these questions would require much more extensive research, but no doubt we will learn more as these issues arise in the political discussions in Brussels.
This post was written by Alan Matthews.
Photo credit: Herbert Kickl © C.Stadler/Bwag; CC-BY-SA-4.0 via Wikipedia Commons