A silly question, some might respond, for are not the EU’s direct payments decoupled (leaving aside the continued existence of a share of coupled payments) and thus not meant to have an effect on farm production? If a direct payment is truly decoupled, then moving payments from one farm to another, or from one country to another, will affect relative incomes but not output.

But there is widespread agreement that even decoupled direct payments do have an effect on production, even if there is less agreement on how strong this effect is in practice. There are now a number of studies which attempt to quantify these effects.

These include the yet-to-be-released Commission draft impact assessment of changes to the direct payments regime, as well as studies using the CAPRI and AGMEMOD models. The general message from these studies is that the production (and thus trade) effects are likely to be small, but that the distributional effects across and within countries could be significant.

Commission AIDS7K model

One approach is illustrated by the Commission’s farm income impact modelling using its AIDS7K model based on FADN data. Because this is a static model with no behavioural structure, it cannot directly calculate possible changes in the structure of production.

However, the Commission reports possible income changes by farm type. If the assumption is made that higher incomes on some farm types will be associated with increased production, and vice versa, then some inferences can be made on the likely direction of production changes.

As a general rule, a uniform flat rate would reduce support in more productive regions and sectors in favour of more marginal regions. In any move towards a flat-rate payment either between or within Member States, grazing livestock (beef and sheep) farms are the main beneficiaries (along with wine and horticultural farms). According to the Commission, moving to a uniform flat rate per hectare of potentially eligible area (PEA) across the EU as a whole (note that in the scenario it models farmers in several Member States continue to receive a limited amount of coupled direct payments (suckler cows, sheep and goat, cotton, Article 68, Posei)) would see farm net value added per Agricultural Work Unit increase by 10% on beef and sheep farms. Farm net value added would fall marginally on milk and arable farms.

(If account were taken of the greening component in Pillar 1, which means farmers must incur additional costs to become eligible for the payment, then the income gain to grazing livestock is reduced and the income losses on milk and arable farms but also pig and poultry farms are exacerbated).

AGMEMOD study

These production effects are more formally modelled in two well-known sector models AGMEMOD and CAPRI. In each case the results are, in part, determined by the modellers’ assumptions about how direct payments impact on production as well as by the policy scenarios that they assume.

The AGMEMOD 2020 combined model is an econometric, dynamic and partial equilibrium model representing each of the 27 Member States. Direct payments are incorporated as add-ons to the relevant producer price to form a reaction price (livestock, livestock products) or expected gross returns (crops).

Coefficients are applied to these add-ons to determine their production effect. For example, a coefficient of 1 would imply that farmers perceive direct payments as equivalent to a similar price increase, while a coefficient of 0 would imply that they treat them as totally decoupled.

The coefficients used in AGMEMOD vary across countries and commodities, for example, to reflect differences between the historic and regional SPS systems. For historical payments the coefficients vary between 0.3 and 0.6 and for regional payments between 0.1 and 0.5. The coefficients for coupled payments lie between 0.5 and 1.0.

Results of moving to a uniform flat-rate payment across the EU as a whole are reported in a recently-published AGMEMOD simulation [access to ScienceDirect required] for wheat, barley, maize, beef, pork and milk. Unfortunately, the consequences of moving to a uniform EU flat-rate payment are conflated with an overall reduction in the CAP budget for direct payments (by around 54% in the final year of implementation). Another important difference with the Commission analysis is that coupled payments are assumed to be decoupled in this analysis, which has particular consequences for the beef results. Despite these more severe assumptions, the production effects are estimated to be very marginal (ranging from 0% to -0.8% of commodity production in 2020) apart from beef where production is estimated to fall by -3.3%.

The AGMEMOD study does not report the expected commodity market price changes although these are presumably correspondingly small. AGMEMOD assumes exogenous world prices which are not affected by the EU net trade balance. To the extent that world prices respond to a reduction in EU production, then the AGMEMOD results, small as they are, also represent upper-bound estimates.

CAPRI study

A second study published by the EU’s Joint Research Centre uses the partial equilibrium CAPRI model together with a specially tailored farm group component called CAPRI farm type (CAPRI FT) to analyse the impact of a flat rate for direct payments at NUTS 1, MS and EU levels (with the level of redistribution and potential impacts increasing in moving to an EU flat rate). The farm models are behavioural programming models in which production and land use (but not farm structure) change in response to changes in relative profitability of different enterprises.

In the CAPRI model direct payments have an impact on production through their partial capitalisation in the returns to land. As direct payments change, so does the cost of land. Thus a reduction in direct payments will favour land-intensive production and vice versa. Land has an elastic supply curve in the model and, at the margin, is in competition with non-agricultural uses such as forest, recreation or nature reserve. So if direct payments fall sufficiently, land moves out of agricultural production and overall production will fall.

The study assumes that if land moves out of production the equivalent direct payment is lost and so overall expenditure on direct payments falls slightly in the scenarios modelled. The scenarios also assume that payments which are coupled in the baseline are decoupled in the scenarios, which will particularly affect beef and sheep as noted earlier.

This study also shows relatively small production and price impacts. In the EU flat rate scenario, which represents the most radical redistribution of direct payments, production generally falls (by -1.3% and -1.9% for cereals, by -1.7% and -0.8% for oilseeds, and by -0.6% and -0.2% for meat in the EU-15 and EU-10 respectively). The maximum price increase was for cereals of 1.5% for the EU-15 and 2.9% for the EU-10, while for meats prices are projected to increase by 1.1% in the EU-15 and 1.2% in the EU-10. The small magnitude of the impacts is due in part to the role of entitlements in limiting land use expansion while allowing for some substitution between grassland and arable land.

Given the small price and production changes, income effects are mainly driven by the redistribution of decoupled payments and to a lesser extent by land use changes. As regards farm types, large and medium size farms and dairies, mixed crops and livestock, general field and mixed cropping, olives, cereals and oilseeds and permanent crops are particularly negatively affected. Small farms tend to be less affected. On the other hand, the most extensive production systems, such as sheep, goats and grazing, the residual farm category and mixed livestock farms, realized higher premiums and incomes. These income changes correspond closely to those projected in the Commission’s AIDS47 model. They are aggregate changes, and there can also be redistribution within farm type groups with some farms gaining income and others losing. These distributional effects are analysed in detail in the study.

Conclusion

The Commission’s 2013 legislative proposals to be released next month will contain a number of measures likely to affect the level of EU domestic production and thus the impact of EU agricultural policy on third countries. The most significant will be the market measures confirming the elimination of milk and sugar quotas. But changes in the design of direct payments, including the overall budget for these payments, redistribution across farmers and member states, the introduction of the greening component, and the extent to which payments can be coupled or not, can also potentially have market effects.

Redistribution of direct payments (moving from the historic payment for entitlement payments to a regional flat-rate system in the EU-15 Member States plus Malta and Slovenia, and moving to greater convergence in the value of payment entitlements across Member States) will tend to shift payments from more productive to less productive Member States, and from more intensive to less intensive farms within Member States.

Redistribution of payments on its own would thus be expected to have a negative effect on EU production. Recent studies support this intuition but suggest that the effects will be very marginal, in most cases less than 1-2%. The effects are somewhat larger for cereals than for livestock but still rather small. Overall, therefore, the studies support the view that the EU’s direct payments are rather decoupled in practice.

The study looks at three scenarios. The reference case assumes a 20% (nominal) CAP budget reduction, reduced intervention stocks, full decoupling, a 30% direct payment reduction, a 105% increase for the second pillar, and a moderate Doha agreement (based on the Falconer paper, including the elimination of export subsidies). The conservative scenario presumes that the Health Check results are largely maintained, direct payments reduced by only 15% and second pillar payments raised by 45%. The liberal scenario is very liberal indeed, with a 55% CAP budget reduction, no intervention stocks, no direct payments, a 100% increase for the second pillar and no tariffs.

Among the most interesting results is that the volume of crop production will grow slowly in all scenarios (around 0.25% per year). Even the vulnerable livestock sector loses only 4% in the liberal scenario over the entire 2007-2020 period. Agricultural land use remains roughly unchanged in the reference and conservative scenarios, and declines by a mere 6% in the liberal scenario (due to the decline in the EU-15, driven mostly by the abolition of the Single Farm Payment).

More significant differences arise when it comes to land prices. These remain largely unchanged in the reference and conservative cases, but decrease by 30% in the liberal scenario. This is nothing the public need worry about – but it explains the heavy lobbying of landowners for the preservation of a ‘strong’ CAP.

The study also analyzes the situation of rural regions. It concludes that strong rurality is not synonymous with negative economic or demographic trends. 422 regions have a negative and 435 regions a positive demographic trend (with negative developments in the eastern Member States and at the southern and northern borders of the EU). The study also finds that ‘There is no evidence that the EU-27 regions with an above average agricultural employment are generally showing negative reactions. Hence, it shall be emphasised that rurality and agricultural vocation are not a sign of weak development perspectives.’ This further undermines the rural development approach of the CAP that spreads money to all rural regions, often in positive correlation with their agricultural production.

A last point to consider: surveys of life satisfaction and happiness give very similar results for urban and rural areas. Since ‘happiness’ is in vogue (and heads of states from Bhutan to France argue for happiness accounting to complement GDP figures), why worry if rural regions have a lower GDP per capita, so long as people there are equally satisfied?

It is thus an opportune time to evaluate the EU’s response to the crisis, and to see what lessons might be drawn for how the Union can address similar problems in other farm sectors in the future. My view is that there is a lot to be learned from the dairy crisis, and that the outgoing Commissioner deserves credit for the way she handled it.

EU milk prices improving

Let us first review the evidence that the milk market is improving. The trends in the EU market prices (proxied by the German price and represented by the blue line) and the EU intervention price (the red line) for butter and skim milk powder (SMP) have been graphed by CLAL.it and are reproduced below.

The German butter price is now back to the level of 2002 before the cuts in intervention prices. The recovery in SMP prices has not been as strong, but even so these are now comfortably above intervention levels. EU dairy farmers also benefit from an additional €5 billion per year in the form of direct payments (3.5c/kg milk) to compensate for the reductions in intervention prices.

Farm prices are responding to the better prices for dairy products, although with some lag. The average EU price for standardised 4.2% fat milk, according to the LTO, has risen to €27.06/100kg in October 2009 from its lowest point of €23.74/100kg in April. It is now back at the levels of Spring 2007, before the big run-up in prices in 2008.

The recent USDA market outlook for dairy products in 2010 foresees continued strong prices into 2010 as economic growth recovers particularly in developing countries. While the large stocks of SMP in particular overhanging the market are seen as a negative factor, it observes that in the US most of these stocks are committed for domestic food programmes and that the EU is unlikely to release its stocks on to the market soon for fear of the political fallout from producers.

The Commission’s response to the dairy crisis

Assuming that prices continue to strengthen throughout 2010, it is useful to review what lessons were learned for crisis management when faced with a substantial fall in the price of a farm commodity. The Union’s responses to the collapse in domestic milk prices in 2009 can be divided into market management measures and income support measures.

Among the market management measures were

In total, the Commission expects to spend up to €600 million on market measures this year.

Among the income support measures were:

Reflections on the Union’s response to the dairy crisis

A first observation to make is that, while the Commission did resort to market management measures such as intervention and export subsidies, much more emphasis on this occasion was put on income support measures.

It was noticeable that the Commissioner firmly set her face against any increase, even temporarily, in intervention prices and against a reduction in quotas, arguing that both would be against the spirit of the Health Check intended to move the CAP in a more market-oriented direction.

Although the future of export refunds after 2013 is uncertain (the EU has committed to their elimination but only in the context of a successful outcome of the Doha Round in which similar disciplines applied to other forms of export support), it is likely that the greater emphasis on direct income support measures in response to crisis is here to stay. While the loud voices calling for stronger support measures as part of a food security policy for Europe would doubtless like to see stronger market management measures, these are effectively beggar-my-neighbour responses unless undertaken as part of a global framework (e.g. a global stocks policy).

A second observation is that the income support measures included both a relaxation of state aid restrictions (allowing Member States to fund payments to producers) and a Community scheme. While the national state aids were permitted only in the context of a measure taken as part of a wider response to the economic crisis, they do flag a possible direction for future responses to agricultural market crises. When the figures come in, it will be interesting to assess how much use the individual Member States make of this opportunity.

A third observation is that the payments will be made to producers only with a lag (the exception is the speeding up of the disbursement of the standard Single Farm Payment). This means that payments will reach farmers after the crisis has passed and when incomes are already recovering. Clearly, payments should reach farmers at the time when they are most needed, and hopefully the decision to allow the Commission to respond to future dairy market crises on its own initiative may facilitate this in future.

A fourth observation is that there is now little headroom in the EU budget up to 2013 to fund unexpected crisis management measures. The outgoing Commissioner has made clear that funding the €300m emergency aid from the 2010 budget has utilised any remaining headroom and, apart from the use of the safety margin, any further call on the agricultural budget would trigger the financial discipline mechanism requiring a cut in direct payments.

Price volatility on agricultural markets is expected to increase in future (though whether this is a reasonable presumption to make deserves further analysis, and the outcome depends on the interaction between production shocks and their distribution where climate change is expected to increase volatility, trade policies and their implications for price transmission from world to national markets, and government behaviour particularly with reference to stocks).

Presumably these lessons will be analysed by the High Level Experts’ Group on Milk which is looking into the medium and long-term future of the dairy sector and which will deliver its final report by the end of June 2010. A very useful input is the report on price volatility in the dairy sector commissioned by the European Dairy Association and written by my Irish colleagues Michael Keane and Declan O’Connor.

The 2009 EU dairy market crisis was handled well by the outgoing Commissioner. There was no back-tracking in the direction of CAP reform, and a number of innovative new instruments to address income volatility in a particular sector are being tested. The lessons learned from this experience will be an important input into the discussions on the shape of the CAP post-2013.

Update 5 January 2010: When writing this post, I had not seen that the French have made use of the national state aid provision to provide up to €700 million to farmers affected by the crisis. Aid under this new scheme can be granted until 31 December 2010 and will take the form of direct grants, interest rate subsidies, subsidised loans as well as aid towards the payment of social security contributions. See http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1866&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en,

Environmental Defense, a US conservation group, has joined with 14 other NGOs in calling on Congress to resist pressure to release 24 million acres from the Conservation Reserve Progam (roughly three quarters of all land currently enrolled in the program). The letter says:

“We urge you to protect the taxpayers’ investment in soil quality, water quality, and wildlife habitat and not allow landowners to leave CRP contracts early without fully reimbursing the Treasury for the taxpayer-funded investment in those lands.”

Currently, conservation contract enrollees who terminate their contract prior to the end of its 10- to 15-year term must reimburse the federal government for the rental and cost-share payments they have received, plus interest, and a penalty of 25 percent of the total rental payments received.

It is important to note that there is a major difference in emphasis between EU and US conservation programmes in that EU schemes are less about land retirement and more about improving practices on working lands. A European farmer who puts land into an agri-environment scheme is not required to abandon all production on the land, rather to farm the land according to higher standards of soil and conservation, apply fewer agrochemicals and take action to benefit wildlife and biodiversity.

In cases where EU agri-environment schemes do entail a significantly lower intensity of production, I have no doubt that many European farmers are already considering whether it’s worth staying in the scheme.

Focusing on the period 2003/05 to 2013/15, the study foresees that the EU will switch from being a net exporter of grains to a net importer, while its import deficit in oilseeds will increase. The principal reason for the changes in the net trade position is the significant growth in domestic demand for bio-energy production.

An aside in the study is what it projects for organic food production in Europe. Noting that organic food production requires more acreage than conventional farming, it observes that the growth in the area devoted to organic production has been slowing down and that sustained high prices for food in general will contribute to a further slow-down in this market segment.

A video presentation by Professor Harald von Witzke summarising the report can be found at the following two YouTube links
Humboldt report on global market trends Part 1

Humboldt report on global market trends Part 2

Ireland gets way more than it’s fair share of EU farm handouts. And this fact will not be lost to other member states if Ireland votes to derail the Lisbon Treaty. The EU is currently engaged in a fundamental, ‘once in generation’ review of its budget. The main target for cuts appears to be the agriculture budget, which accounts for around 45% of all EU spending.

Here are some facts that might be of interest:

- Ireland pays €730 million towards the CAP (€178 per citizen) but gets €1.736 billion out of it (€423 per citizen). This gives a positive budgetary balance of €1.007 billion (€245 per citizen), the biggest net gain per citizen of any EU country. Remember that Ireland has a GDP per capita of €32,600, the second highest in Europe.

- Ireland receives €10,577 in CAP direct payments per farm worker (the highest in the EU), and €279 per hectare of farmland.

- Ireland’s farm sector not only benefits from cash payments from the EU, but a high level of tariff protection on its key sectors of beef and dairy. According to the OECD which tries to measure these things, beef farmers in Europe received border protection worth €10 billion in 2006, around 43% of the value of total EU beef production. This hidden consumer tax on the price of beef represents 43% of the total revenue of EU beef farmers.

- 75% of Ireland’s land area is classified as ‘less favoured’. This means it gets the EU’s area-based compensation payments under the Disadvantaged Area Compensatory Allowance of EUR 257 million in 2006.

- Over at farmsubsidy.org we recently released a list of farm subsidy payments in Ireland. Only the top 100 are named because the Irish Government felt that to name the others would be infringing on their constitutional rights to receive handouts in secret. 37 per cent of EU farm payments in Ireland go to the top 10 per cent of recipients.

- Agriculture accounts for 0.9 per cent Ireland’s GDP but 28 per cent of Ireland’s greenhouse gas emissions, chiefly because of the methane emissions of its large subsidy-driven cattle herd. Ireland is currently 11 per cent above its Kyoto Protocol target.

Nobody likes to be blackmailed, and if Irish farmers have a hand in throwing the EU into another 2005-style constitutional turmoil, this will not be forgotten. Irish farmers get more than most from the EU, they may live to regret biting the hand that feeds them.

Several funds have been set up to buy farmland, particularly in the UK where prices have risen 40 per cent over the last year. Manchester-based group Braemar had to close a fund it launched after two weeks. Higher commodity prices have also attracted institutional investors such as Blackrock and Schroeder.

Good quality arable land in the UK is fetching £6,000-£8,500 an acre in many parts of the country. Buyers from Denmark and Ireland have been piling into the UK for several years. Some estimates suggest that as many as 30 to 40 per cent of buyers in the eastern countries of England are coming from overseas.

Land prices fell between 1997 and 2003 in the UK after the BSE and foot and mouth crises. The price could rise to £8,000 – £10,000 an acre, close to the price in parts of Denmark, but industry experts predict that it will rise more slowly from now. One factor who has been ‘lifestyle buyers’ who run farms as hobbies rather than businesses, while field sports are a factor in purchases within reach of London.

There are considerable variations in land prices across the EU. In Lithuania a hectare of agricultural land cost €734 in 2006 compared with €164,340 in Luxembourg, the most expensive country. In Poland the average price rose 60 per cent between 2003 and 2006. Foreigners cannot buy land in Poland until 2016 but it is easy for investors to set up a local company to bypass the rules.

In France land is about €6,000 a hectare because it must be offered first to young local farmers. However, land prices are still 50 per cent up on 2003.

You can read a transcript of Zoellick’s press briefing here, and the analysis note which includes a discussion of the policy options available to address the problem of food affordability in developing countries.

I will turn to what the end of the era of cheap food means for the CAP in a forthcoming blog post.

Some of the most serious problems have arisen in relation to rice where prices have risen by 50 per cent in two weeks. Leading exporting countries including Vietnam, India, China and Egypt have banned foreign sales.

Another policy response is to resort to export taxes, a strategy being followed in Argentina, although raising revenue appears to be as much of a motive of ensuring domestic supply. Indeed, the strategy has backfired as farmers have gone on strike and mounted road blocks, emptying cattle markets so that Argentinians cannot get their steaks. President Cristina Fernandez has resorted to the classic Peronist trick of trying to rouse the ‘masses’ against an alleged privileged group, in this case the farmers.

Given the importance of Argentina as an agricultural exporter, increasing soyabean taxes from 35 per cent to 40 per cent affects world supplies. Grain exports have also been disrupted.

All this is grist to the mill of those who have been calling for self-sufficiency targets in Europe, backed up by the continuation of blanket subsidies. As we have suggested in earlier postings, this rhetoric has had a substantial influence on decision makers. There is a danger of a reversion to a simple minded productionist paradigm, already being celebrated with an element of triumphalism by some farming spokespersons.

A leading exponent of this position is Norfolk farmer and Farmers Weekly columnist David Richardson who has played his cards on this issue well. His paper on the issue suggests that ‘it would not be much of an exaggeration to suggest that within the forseeable future it will be necessary to deal with the production of food as during the war.’ In the UK it was, of course, the experience of wartime production which led to the 1947 Agriculture Act, creating privileged access to government for the National Farmers’ Union and substantial subsidies for its members. Could these halcyon days return?

You can read David Richardson’s full paper here. It’s a concise statement of an increasingly influential viewpoint.

However, we must avoid a retreat into neo-Malthusian gloom. The gains available from new technology and better agronomic techniques must not be overlooked. Where there has been a policy error is in running down research on improving food production. The privatisation of the state extension service, something that was not done in the United States or, for example, Denmark, was also a mistake which means that there is no neutral body disseminating knowledge to farmers.

As well as being the founding editor of the AgraFacts news subscription service, Roger is a Journalism Fellow of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.