So, is examination of member states’ financial net contributions a shameful exercise: hiking up national egoism and ignoring the larger benefits of European integration? Not at all. If CAP funds were spent exclusively on European public goods, such as climate change mitigation or the protection of endangered species, national bottom lines would indeed not matter. The money should be allocated wherever greenhouse gas reductions can be achieved most cheaply or where the need for wildlife protection is the greatest.

But as things stand, CAP subsidies are mostly free handouts to member states and their farming communities – they do not create commensurate value for European citizens. This applies in particular to the Single Farm Payment which farmers receive as long as they keep their land in ‘good agricultural and environmental condition’. These minimum conditions largely correspond to the legal baseline – that is, all farmers need to do is to respect the law.

Making those who pay for this waste aware of their unfavorable position actually serves European integration. The CAP absorbs more than 40% of the EU budget, depriving the EU of the renewed momentum it could gain if it became more relevant for attaining the priorities of the future. Citizens are ready to support an EU that creates real value added – by tackling climate change, promoting European infrastructure, or enhancing internal and external security. They are never going to endorse an EU that lavishes money on one politically powerful sector to the detriment of the entire economy.

The distributional issue behind CAP reform will become ever more critical over the next years. Public debts will continue to rise and painful spending cuts will make the population more sensitive to wasteful expenditures. Also, the strain on financial solidarity in the EU provoked by the debt/Euro crisis will spur interest in the transfer mechanisms hidden in the EU budget.

So who is cutting the best deal in the CAP? And who has pulled the short straw? A short paper of mine can be downloaded here. The paper focuses on member states’ receipts of direct income support under the first pillar, which total €42 billion. These are compared with member states’ contributions to financing the direct income support. The national contributions are comprised of the contributions based on value added taxes (VAT) and gross national income (GNI), corrected for the UK rebate and other exceptions.

The most important net contributor to direct income support in 2010 is Germany with €2.44 billion, followed by Italy with a negative net balance of €1.6 billion. Other important net contributors are the Netherlands, Belgium and the United Kingdom.

The biggest beneficiaries, each gaining more than €1 billion, are Greece, Poland and Spain, followed by France, Ireland and Hungary. All these countries defend a large CAP budget and a strong first pillar. Irrespective of their public justification, the money their farmers receive from other member states’ taxpayers certainly plays a role in their love for the old-style CAP.

The net balance for all major net payers will further deteriorate in the coming years. In 2013, Germany will make a net contribution of roughly €3 billion, followed by Italy with €1.9 billion, the Netherlands with €900 million and Belgium with €800 million. The strongest deteriorations in the net balance affect Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Belgium. France sees its net gains shrink from €868 million in 2010 to less than half in 2013.

Is it advisable for the EU-12 to push for a strong first pillar with much direct income support? Clearly, the EU-12 will be much better off by shifting the money from the CAP to the EU’s cohesion funds. EU-12 member states receive a share of every € spent that is three times higher for cohesion funds than for direct income support under the CAP. The ratio for Estonia is 5, for the Czech Republic, Latvia and Romania 4 or higher, and for Poland and Slowenia above 3.

You can download the entire paper here.

Great Britain went through a protectionist phase in agriculture after the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, lasting for three decades until the repeal of the Corn Law in 1846. In food-importing Great Britain, the interruption of trade through Napoleon’s Continental Blockade had driven up food prices and farmers resisted the subsequent resumption of trade in peacetime. But the historic roots of continental agricultural protectionism, I always thought, were somewhat more recent, namely the transport cost revolution of the second half of the 19th century. As it became economically efficient to transport grain by train from the US Midwest to the East Coast, and then by ship to Europe, agrarian interests defended the higher rents on scarcer European land against the international convergence of factor prices.

However, I stumbled upon an intriguing paragraph by Findlay and O’Rourke (Power and Plenty, p. 374) that dates some continental agrarian protectionism back to Napoleonic wars: ‘in 1811, faced with the growing scarcity of sugar, Napoleon issued a decree promoting beet cultivation through a variety of means, leading to a rapid growth in the number of factories. This new industry, which eventually spread to several other Northern Hemisphere countries, would soon become dependent on government subsidies and protection, since tropical producers retained important underlying cost advantages. Indeed, government production and export subsidies became so prevalent that in 1902 nine European countries … signed the first international primary commodity agreement, the Brussels Convention, which aimed at abolishing sugar subsidies. In this sector, therefore, war time import substitution had not only a long-run effect on subsequent trade policies, but also a large negative impact of tropical sugar producers, particularly from the 1870s onwards … Between 1860 and 1900, European countries increased their share of world trade in sugar from zero to 60%. … By 1902, free-market sugar prices had declined to little more than a third of their 1880 level.’

What an outstanding example of policies’ path dependence! There is a dangerous tendency in man to rationalize the past and call for continuity. Generally it feels better to say: ‘We have done what we had to do. Now times are changing and we need to adapt by building on what we have already achieved’, than to admit ‘We have seriously messed up in the past and now we need to start again with a clean slate.’ It would be preferable to be honest and concede that agricultural protectionism – including but also antedating the CAP – was a big mistake and that we need to move on to an entirely different policy targeting sustainable land use.

Another thought that comes to mind from this historical perspective: both causes of agricultural protectionism, from the early and late 19th century, are classical examples of special interests defending their rents to the detriment of collective welfare. The idea that agricultural subsidies/protectionism originated with the food shortages of the Second World War is clearly a myth. Whilst this experience facilitated the creation of the CAP, the real driving forces of the second half of the 20th century have remained the same as ever: the sectoral interest of agriculture.

The reformist zeal of the 15 professors in the German scientific advisory board on agriculture is remarkable, and their statement (in German) largely concurs with the declaration for ‘A Common Agricultural Policy for European Public Goods’ signed by experts from all across Europe half a year ago. The statement even goes beyond the recent proposals (in German) made by the German Advisory Council on the Environment (SRU): agricultural economists overtake environmental experts in their demands for CAP reform.

According to the scientific advisory board on agriculture, market price, direct income and farm-level investment support should be removed. There is no reason to fear a massive breakdown in EU agriculture: 61% of German agricultural area is rented out, so that large share of direct payments does not benefit farming anyway; bioenergy makes it increasingly attractive to continue farming; structural change will allow significant cost reductions to make farming more competitive; several agricultural sub-sectors are economically viable, and have been so for a long time, without receiving significant subsidies and tariff protection; the extra costs of higher EU standards are low for most farms (less than €50/ha); and targeted payments to maintain agriculture in areas threatened by undesirable land abandonment can compensate adverse effects.

Coping with fluctuating market prices will be a key entrepreneurial challenge for farmers – and not a cause for government intervention. Governments may have some role to play to address production risks that cannot be efficiently insured – especially with regard to droughts. However, adaptation to climate change falls again primarily into farmers’ responsibility, while governments should limit their activity to providing public goods (such as meteorological forecasts, research and innovation).

A sectoral approach tied to agriculture is not a suitable mechanism for regional development. Furthermore, responsibility for regional development should be shifted to lower levels of governance.

Significantly more funds should be dedicated to targeted public-goods programs. In addition to the traditional objectives of climate change and wildlife biodiversity, the importance of maintaining the diversity of the agricultural genetic pool is highlighted. It should be examined which of these public-goods policies are best integrated into the agricultural resort and which should be transferred to other ministries.

This is a world apart from the official German position, dated March 31, 2010, and agreed by the federal and Länder ministries. The ministries favor the status quo plus some more Health-Check style modifications. The two-pillar system with a strong first pillar, centered on direct income support, should be maintained. The CAP should be further simplified and remaining market interventions be reduced to a safety net. Socio-economic objectives should remain central. And the current distribution of subsidies across member states should be upheld.

When will these two worlds clash? So far, the Ministry of Economy (liberal, FDP) and the Finance Ministry (conservative, CDU) have been silent on CAP reform and left the issue largely to the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection (Bavarian conservatives, CSU). But the strain of the financial and economic crisis on public budgets – together with the growing public discontentment with Germany’s responsibility to pay for the EU and other member states’ deficits – makes a showdown inevitable.

It is EU practice (and legislation) to subject the CAP to a sophisticated system of evaluations. For each member state’s rural development program (RDP), an ex-ante, mid-term and ex-post evaluation is being undertaken by independent bodies. Other studies, commissioned by DG Agri or DG Research, examine specific CAP instruments across Europe on a rolling basis. In addition, the European Court of Auditors scrutinizes selected CAP instruments (here you can find summaries of their CAP-related studies).

But how independent are the evaluators? How strong is their mandate? How useful are the findings? In a recent article in EuroChoices, Angela Bergschmidt, an evaluator from the Federal Research Institute in charge of agriculture in Germany, offers a bleak account:

[It is] a useless evaluation; costly, often low in scientific quality, unread and unnoticed by policymakers and the wider public.

Evaluation results have apparently not been used to implement changes in the new RDP either at EU level or with respect to adoption by the Commission of the RDPs of Member States.

my experience in Germany is that neither the Federal Ministry for Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection nor the Ministries of the Federal States are convinced of the evaluation concept. The Administration is accustomed to implementing measures without performance review, adapting them mainly for fiscal or political reasons. As a consequence, the results of an evaluation are used as a line of reasoning if they fit into actual strategies.

the main concern of individual managing authorities is to fulfil formal evaluation requirements

the evaluation unit remains understaffed and is unable to carry out quality control procedures for the large number of RDP evaluations

A seminar on May 19 will take a closer look at ‘Rural Development Policy in the EU – Lessons from the Past and Options for the Future’. The seminar focuses on the evaluation process for rural development programs and how this can inform and improve rural development policy in the EU. One objective of the conference is to discuss how better evidence on the key questions of policy design can be gathered. This is a crucial challenge ahead of the fundamental post-2013 CAP reform. In addition, the researchers have summarized the evidence that is available from existing evaluation reports, drawing lessons for the future direction of policy.

A smarter CAP debate

The seminar is part of a new series of seminars on CAP reform.

The EU needs a smart CAP debate. The CAP is the EU’s most expensive policy, costing € 57 billion annually. The success of the EU 2020 strategy and the next long-term EU budget cycle depends on CAP reform. Furthermore, the CAP is a key lever for promoting biodiversity and fighting climate change. A policy debate of the highest standards is needed to prepare the ground for making the right decisions on CAP reform.

But the debate about the future of the CAP is often poorly informed and distorted. Emotions take centerstage: fears over food insecurity, compassion for small-scale farmers and attachment to the rural way of life can hinder evidence-based analysis. The debate is also driven by special interests, with farmers protesting in the streets and extensive lobbying behind closed doors. Narrowly-conceived national interests in maximizing the receipt of EU subsidies also bias perspectives and arguments.

ECIPE and reformthecap.eu are organizing a series of seminars to help non-experts determine the facts. More and more stakeholders are starting to take an interest in the CAP. They feel that something is wrong with the policy but find it hard to challenge the justifications provided by insiders who defend the status quo. The seminars will provide an overview of what research has to say on critical issues in reforming the CAP. The aim is to inform all stakeholders through easily accessible, high-quality presentations by recognized experts: providing the best science at your fingertips.

The EP own-initiative report on the post-2013 CAP is taking shape as a new draft has become available (dated 24.3.2010). Though it is better packaged, and sexed-up with a ‘green growth’ tag, the content is just as dull and conservative as the earlier draft. The report captures the intellectual deficiency of the CAP-insider bubble.

The draft report suggests 5 ‘key building blocks’: area-based direct income support, climate change mitigation payments, payments to areas with natural handicaps, payments for biodiversity and environmental protection, and green growth subsidies with a focus on renewable energy. The first two payments are to be fully financed by the EU, and the other three co-financed by the member states.

I will not go into the reports’ food-security and fair-income arguments (though they thoroughly deserve criticism) but will limit myself to commenting on some peculiar lines of reasoning that are considered to prop up the case for a strong CAP.

whereas the share of CAP expenditure in the EU budget has steadily decreased from nearly 75% in 1985 to a projected 39.3% in 2013; whereas this represents less than 0.45% of the EU’s GDP; whereas the decline in budgetary expenditure on market measures is even more significant – from 74% of all CAP expenditure in 1992 to less than 10% at present;

“Measured against the EU budget and GDP, we are wasting less money today than in the past.” This is correct as an empirical assertion about past policy changes. It is not an argument that could justify the expenditure of a single euro on the CAP. Maybe 0.0% is the right spending target. It could theoretically also be optimal to spend 1.0% of GDP on agriculture through the CAP. Whatever the right solution is, reference to past spending levels is not acceptable as an argument in the debate about desirable future policy choices.

whereas the EU continues to experience a widening trade deficit in agricultural products

and

insists that EU agriculture must remain competitive against fierce competition from well-subsidised trade partners; therefore believes that competitiveness should still be a fundamental objective of the CAP post-2013 to ensure that the EU has the raw materials to produce high-value European food products and they continue to win a greater share of the world market

Where is the problem with a trade deficit in agriculture? And why should the EU gain shares in world agricultural markets? The basic assumption of economists is that each country benefits if it specializes according to its comparative advantage. In those developing countries where the most competitive sector happens to be agriculture, governments are often skeptic about excessive specialization and prefer a more complex economic argument based on the dynamic gains of investing in manufacturing and service sectors that allow their country to climb up the value chain in the future. But the EU’s competitive advantage is much more concentrated in high-value-added sectors (high-tech, professional services, luxury goods, research and innovation). In other words: we are lucky. It makes no sense to work against this specialization and export more agricultural products. Since trade accounts roughly balance in the long-term, more agricultural exports would automatically imply fewer exports of these high-value-added products and services in which the EU enjoys a comparative advantage.

recalls, therefore, that unless farming activity is preserved across the EU, no provision of public goods will be possible;

and

insists that the cost of support through a strong CAP is nothing compared to the costs of no action and its negative unintended consequences;

The death of European agriculture is again at the doorstep. The day the CAP is abolished, there is no country to walk in, no food to eat, no water to drink, no air to breathe. These wild beliefs can be divided into two ‘analytical’ steps: first, that agriculture would actually collapse, and second, that this would create overwhelming problems. In reality, agricultural production will most likely continue to grow – with or without policy support (see DG Agri study: Don’t be afraid of liberalization and Crystal ball gazing: Scenar II study on the effects of CAP reform). If agricultural production were to decline dramatically, this would cause some problems – but it would also create great benefits, notably in terms of water quality and climate change (though this depends on second-order effects abroad). But CAP supporters rarely say “We believe that without the CAP, there would be a slight decrease in production, and this would have negative effects on balance.” They almost inevitably turn to the dramatic – “unless farming activity is preserved across the EU, no provision of public goods will be possible” – a situation that would be so horrible that the €55 billion we are paying every year must be deemed nothing short of “nothing”.

I have criticized three points: the reference to past spending as a justification for future spending; the blindly mercatintilist appetite for world market shares; and the all-or-nothing drama when it comes to the survival of European agriculture and the public goods that depend on it. Together, they are examples of a fundamental problem in EU agricultural policy-making: the CAP debate is taking place in a bubble. Agricultural ministries, DG Agri, the EP Committee on Agriculture, farmers, the landowners and rural interests reinforce each other in the CAP-insider community. Radically critical voices are sidelined. The CAP is made within a bubble by people who want to keep the CAP as it stands or to reform it as much as is necessary to preserve it. Lines of arguments such as those I have picked out above can prosper in such an environment. Strikingly unsound statements, which would, in other policy domains, be dismissed with laughter as intellectually deficient, are the respectable mainstream in agriculture.

The Rapporteur of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (ComAgri), George Lyon, has presented his take on the post-2013 CAP. Once the document has been discussed and amended by ComAgri, it will be voted upon first in ComAgri (June) and then in the EP plenary (July).

The starting point of the draft already chills expectations: “The Common Agricultural Policy has been largely successful in fulfilling the objectives it was set out to accomplish so far.”

Three groups of objectives are identified. 1) Supporting economic needs – including an EU agriculture competitive on world markets, EU food security in an unstable world context, and the valuable contribution EU agriculture and the downstream agri-food sector make to EU growth and employment.

2) Responding to social concerns – to enhance farmers’ incomes that are lower than the EU average in most member States and that decreased in 2009; to support the sustainable, dynamic and balanced socio-economic development of European rural communities; to attract younger generations to rural areas and activities; and to tackle rural unemployment.

3) Delivering benefits in terms of public goods – with a focus on the positive externalities of agriculture, justifying ‘a strong and well-supported CAP’.

From these objectives, the draft moves to an outline of future CAP measures and structures. The basic tenet is: keep things roughly as they are. Maintain some market measures as a safety net, continue with the Single Farm and the Less-Favored Area Payments, and uphold flexible spending entitlements that are fully community-financed (roughly corresponding to Art. 68). The current budget should also be kept, and co-financing limited to the sort of measures that currently fall under co-financing.

At some point, the report asks for the “maximisation of the delivery of environmental goods”. But this is misleading rhetoric. You can spend any Euro only once. If you want to serve many objectives and finance many measures that have nothing to be with environmental goods, you are leaving little for the environment.

For this draft, any argument is good enough if it results in payments to farmers. In the category “Supporting economic needs”, one objective is “corrections to market failures such as exposure to natural disasters, high risk and price volatility, lack of demand elasticity, farmers’ position as ‘price takers’ in the food chain, etc.” Since when are natural disasters a market failure? Or high risks, or a lack of demand elasticity? These are market conditions that determine how profitable a given sector is and who should be in this sector (according to how successful individual economic actors are in coping with these conditions). They can, in particular circumstances, give rise to market failures, and these market failures can, again in particular circumstances, justify efficient state action (which is unlikely to take the form of round-about income support or market intervention to support prices). But considering all these phenomena enumerated above as ‘market failures’ that somehow warrant the Single Farm Payment or price intervention is untenable.

What is most upsetting is that this draft comes from George Lyon, who happens to be a Liberal Democrat from the UK. These are the best reform credentials one could wish for. Once MEPs from other party groups and member states have introduced their amendments, the outcome will likely be worse.

But why would a Liberal Democrat from the UK write such a draft? Have a look at his homepage. Mr. Lyon was brought up in a seventh-generation tenant-farming family, occupied different positions within the National Farmers’ Union (NFU) starting in 1989, and had a stint as President of NFU Scotland in 1998-1999. He is hardly a special case. ComAgri MEPs frequently have close farming ties, which helps to explain why they overwhelmingly support a CAP that serves farmers first. If the EP wants to be worthy of its new powers in agriculture, it must intervene early and forcefully in the work of ComAgri.

1789: the people of Paris take the Bastille. 1848: republican upheaval all across Europe. 1917: the Communists take power in Russia. 2010: the European Socialists & Democrats declare that the CAP needs to be revolutionized. Admittedly, the S&D do not pretend to lay claim to quite such daring historical parallels – but there is no doubt that they make bold claims: the ‘one step at a time while maintaining the original philosophy’ approach of the 1992, 2000, 2003 and 2008/09 reforms has been ‘overly timid’. Explaining that progressives are those who anticipate and guide ambitious reform processes, whereas conservatives only tackle the issues when forced to do so by the emergence of crises or external constraints, they conclude that, ‘the reform of the CAP over the last 15 years has generally followed this second path.’

The S&D give two reasons a ‘New Start’ (yes, in capital letters, just like the ‘New Deal’ they are calling for) is imperative. The first is the common environmental public goods rationality (climate change, water management, renewable energy, biodiversity, soil erosion). The second is a combination of social concerns: reducing regional disparities, redirecting subsidies from the most competitive to more needy farm holdings, and creating employment (‘the granting of aid must absolutely be linked to job creation in rural areas in order to maintain, bring to life and develop the agricultural area in all regions of Europe’).

Concerns about employment and vitality in rural regions seem to point towards the strengthening of the non-agricultural component in rural development (Axes 3 of Pillar 2). But the document takes a most interesting turn in the opposite direction: the ‘hotchpotch’ of Pillar 2 should be cleared up, all CAP subsidies should be merged into one pillar, and all current CAP instruments that no longer fit should be transferred to the regional and cohesion policy.

I have a number of problems with the document. I am concerned about the objective of stimulating agricultural employment through the CAP and do not see the need to have a generalized payment link to natural handicaps. Furthermore, I very much like the extension of national co-financing of CAP subsidies, which the document rejects without further explanation.

Nevertheless, my overall assessment is strongly positive. The level of change envisioned is outstanding, and the general tone is rational/progressive (‘instruments must be better focused on objectives; priority must be given to expenditure that is more socially useful, such as financing of public goods made available to society; and handouts (direct subsidies) must be replaced with measures encouraging those involved to take account of the new requirements (new contractual approaches). Public subsidies should be given to farmers in return for their provision of environmental services and landscape management.’)

Comparing this statement to the stubborn defense of vested interests that is endemic in the EP Committee on Agriculture, it is a great step forward. And this is all the more important since Paolo De Castro, the chairman of the EP Committee on Agriculture, is a Socialist.

Yesterday’s reshuffle of the Danish government included the appointment of a new minister for agriculture: Henrik Høegh. Less than a day into his new job, he is becoming embroiled in a political row over a perceived conflict of interest. The reason? Mr Høegh is a farmer who receives more than sixty thousand euro a year in EU farm subsidies.

Data on farm subsidies shows that since 2000, Mr Høegh has benefited from the CAP to the tune of 604,787 euros over the nine years from 2000 to 2008. Farm subsidies appear to be something of a Høegh family business: it seems his son and daughter are also significant recipients. Mr Høegh is now responsible for signing his own subsidy cheques, but also, as a member of the EU’s Council of Agriculture Ministers, deciding on the future of the CAP.

Høegh’s appointment to such a high profile and sensitive post came as something of a surprise since he’s only been a member of parliament for less than three years, before which time he was a Vice President of Danish Agriculture, the farmers union in Denmark, just the most recent position in a career spent in agricultural and farmer associations (read his CV in English here – PDF).

Of course we’ve been here before. Former Danish farms minister and EU Agriculture Commissioner Mariann Fischer Boel is married to a farmer, with a major business interest at stake in the future of the EU’s farm subsidies and tariff policies. Former Dutch farms minister Cees Veerman was nearly forced to resign when it was revealed that in addition to his farms in the Netherlands, he owned four farms in France, which he had failed to mention in his ministerial declaration of interests, and for which he received nearly two hundred thousand euros in subsidy a year. And the European Parliament’s agriculture committee has long been stuffed with farmers and farmer representatives. It just shows the extent to which the 55 billion euro a year common agricultural policy has been captured by those with a personal financial interest.

This latest row has made it onto Danish national television this evening with journalists, political commentators and opposition politicians questioning whether he can stay in post. With the long-term future of the CAP currently under debate, can the Danish people be confident that Mr Høegh will be pursuing the public interest rather than his own private profits?

I am a great fan of BirdLife’s work on the CAP, but in their joint position paper with the European Landowners’ Organization (ELO), presented on 27 January 2010, BirdLife has taken a step in the wrong direction. What’s more, it has announced that this is only the beginning of their cooperation with the ELO. [...]

Over at the excellent farmpolicy.com Roger Waite, editor of Agra Facts, has posted a thorough account of the appointment of the new EU Agriculture Commissioner Dacian Ciolos. He says that while Romania had sought the powerful position, it was really a case of appointment by default:

I tend to feel that Barroso was left with no other option, as no one was willing to put forward a good candidate – and that he was the only suitable candidate from among the nominees.

[...]

Five leading European farming and environmental NGOs, who between them boast several million members, have jointly published a blueprint for a new Common Agricultural Policy. In an unusual and very modern step, they have published a draft proposal and opened it for consultation. They will produce a final version in 2010. The proposal, which runs to 28 pages, is for a radical reorientation of the CAP away from a productivist and income support model towards a ‘public money for public goods’ ethos. [...]

Scotland is far more in tune with current thinking on farm subsidies in mainland Europe than England and Wales, claims Scotland’s rural affairs minister Richard Lochhead. Addressing farmers at a Christmas Carcass competition in Inverurie, Mr Lochhead brought them glad tidings about the deep divide in agriculture policies on the two sides of the border. ‘My opinion on CAP reform is very different from DEFRA’s view that all direct subsidies should be removed and we should rely on a free market. Scotland should not go down that route and our thinking is much closer to the mainstream of Europe which is that the pendulum is swinging back towards support for active agriculture.’ [...]

With the CAP among the EU’s oldest and biggest policies, it’s something of a surprise that no country has nominated an ‘agriculture specialist’ for the commission. This makes for a challenge to select an able successor to Mariann Fischer Boel, who came to the post having served as Farms Minister in Denmark as well as having farming background herself. In Brussels it seems as if the front-runner is the current Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs of Latvia. [...]

At various times in the history of the CAP, member states have formed informal groupings to address particular issues, e.g., ‘the Aachen Five’ and the agri-monetary system. The G-21, in effect led by France, is a much larger grouping which constitutes a qualified majority in the Council. It become the G-21 rather than the G-20 at a meeting in Vienna when Greece joined. This left only the four leading reform countries (UK, Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden) outside the grouping, plus Cyprus and Malta – countries that have small farm sectors and may not have thought it worth the time and effort. [...]

I’ve always found the notion of ‘agricultural economists’ a curious one. As if the normal rules of economics don’t apply to agriculture and there’s need for a special discipline of agricultural economics. In universities agricultural economists are often housed in their own special departments, separate from the regular Economics department. I wonder if this alternate universe of agricultural economics might explain the state of agriculture policy, whether in the EU, the US or elsewhere. Anyway, today a group of agricultural economists from 22 EU countries has come out in favour of radical reform of the Common Agricultural Policy. [...]

The Lisbon Treaty has been ratified and among it’s political innovations is a “citizens’ petitions” tool. Article 8B says that

“Not less than one million citizens who are nationals of a significant number of Member States may take the initiative of inviting the European Commission, within the framework of its powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties.”

[...]

4000 dairy farmers with 900 tractors demonstrated outside an EU agricultural ministers meeting in Luxembourg yesterday calling for more aid for the sector. Inside, ministers faced a Franco-German memorandum backed by 20 member states with a series of demands for market distorting measures. In the event the concessions the Commission made are probably the least they could have got away with in the circumstances. Farmers’ organisation COPA immediately condemned them as insufficient. [...]

Until recently, I have walked through Brussels with this grey-blue bag that all participants of the 2008 budget review conference received. In the meantime, it has fallen apart, and I don’t have anything to replace it. This is somewhat similar to the CAP & EU budget debate: the 2008 conference presenting the results of the consultation process briefly attracted broad attention, but subsequently, the debate fizzled out and was overwhelmed by the financial and economic crisis. [...]

The next agricultural commissioner will have the chance to shape the future development of the CAP. So who will it be? [...]

Just as it’s hard to love Commission President José Manuel Barroso, it’s hard to loathe him. Maybe that’s why he’s the ultimate compromise candidate and has just secured a second five year term of office. President Barroso has just published political guidelines for the next Commission, setting out his stall for a ‘2020 vision’ of the EU. [...]

The final paragraph of Commissioner Fischer Boel’s valedictory leaflet is revealing and foreshadows the debate that has yet to surface about the future of the CAP after 2013, the end of the current financial perspective. Mrs Fischer Boel makes the case for maintaining a common European agriculture policy among the EU’s 27 member states, presumably funded from the EU budget, as it is now. [...]

With co-decision on agricultural issues likely to come into force from next year, the European Parliament’s Agriculture Committee has assumed a new importance and there was plenty of competition for places. However, one unasnwered question is whether the Budget Committee will have a stronger influence on plenary voting patterns than the Ag committee. [...]

Euractiv reports on the creation of a new Franco-German working group to frame reform of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) after 2013. France has a new Agriculture Minister in Bruno Le Maire, who wasted no time in setting out his stall in meetings with Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso. [...]

Pillar 1 subsidies are likely to continue after 2020, forecast Professor Allan Buckwell, the Policy Director of the Country Land and Business Association, in an interesting talk at the President’s Seminar of the Royal Agricultural Society of England (RASE) in London yesterday. [...]