A feature of the move towards decoupled direct payments in the EU since the Fischler 2003 reform has been greater flexibility for Members States in the management of these payments. This can be seen in various ways: the different options on which to base the Single Payment Scheme; different cross compliance requirements including definition of Good Agricultural and Environmental Conditions; different possibilities for modulating payments between Pillar 1 and Pillar 2; and provisions for ‘national envelopes’ and for the retention of partial coupling.

In this post I examine the future for national envelopes and partial coupling in the light of the Commission’s draft regulation on direct payments after 2013. At issue is the extent to which the draft proposals expand the scope for coupled payments and national flexiblity more generally in the post-2013 period.

National envelopes sometimes refer to the overall ceiling on the funding for direct payments allocated to each Member State, but here I use it in the more specific sense to refer to the share of direct payments over which Member States have some discretion over how to make these payments. They have been contested since their introduction as part of the Agenda 2000 reform. On the one hand, proponents argue that they are a response to calls for greater subsidiarity because they give greater flexibility to Member States on how to allocate aid payments to help specific groups of farmers. For this reason, they have been viewed sceptically by other Member States which fear that they could lead to distortions of competition since they are implemented according to national criteria.

Article 69 in the 2003 reform

The 2003 reform allowed Member States to retain up to 10% of their previously coupled payment ceilings under Pillar 1 for specific supports to farming and quality production (Article 69 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1782/2003). The additional payment had to be granted for specific types of farming which were important for the protection or enhancement of the environment or for improving the quality and marketing of agricultural products. Furthermore, the money had to be returned to the sectors from which it was withheld.

Seven Member States and one region chose to implement national envelopes under Article 69 – Finland, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Scotland (UK) [see Commission summary here]. All Member States which implemented national envelopes used the measure to support the beef sector, with support for the arable and sugar sectors supported by four Member States each. Other sectors for which national envelopes were used included the sheep, dairy, tobacco, olive oil and cotton sectors, with Italy introducing a national envelope for energy crops in 2007.

Article 68 in the 2008 reform

In the 2008 Health Check, Article 69 (now renumbered as Article 68 of Regulation 73/2009) expanded the scope of national envelopes while keeping the overall 10% share of each Member State’s direct payments ceiling [IEEP has a good briefing on this]. Its purpose remains assistance to sectors or regions with particular difficulties but its use became more flexible. Member States can continue to use these payments for environmental measures or improving the quality and marketing of products or animal welfare. However, the money no longer had to be used in the same sector although this option was continued.

But in addition, the national envelope can now be used to help farmers producing milk, beef, goat and sheep meat and rice in disadvantaged regions or to support economically vulnerable types of farming. It can be used to top up entitlements in areas where land abandonment is a threat. It may also be used to support risk management measures such as contributions to crop and animal insurance premia and mutual funds for plant and animal diseases. Countries operating the Single Area Payment Scheme (SAPS) became eligible to use national envelopes for the first time. Moreover, Member States which made use of Article 69 of Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 were given a transitional period in order to allow for a smooth transition to the new rules for specific support.

In order to comply with WTO Green Box conditions, support for potential trade-distorting measures under Article 68 is limited to 3.5% of national ceilings. This includes support for types of farming important for the protection of the environment, support to address specific disadvantages, and support for mutual funds.

Member States were given three opportunities to make use of Article 68 in that they could notify the Commission of their intentions in August 2009, August 2010 or August 2011. By comparing the Commission’s regular summaries of the implementation details it is clear that use of Article 68 has expanded over time. In the May 2011 summary, only Cyprus, Malta and Luxembourg appeared not to make use of Article 68 at all.

Partial coupling

The provisions for specific support in the national envelope articles should be seen in the context of the possibilities for continuing partial coupling under the Single Payment Scheme. In the 2003 Fischler reform, there was significant scope to retain partial coupling. For example, Member States could continue to couple 25% of arable payments and 40% for durum wheat (Article 66), 50% of payments to sheep and goats (Article 67), 100% suckler cow premium and 40% of slaughter premium or 100% slaughter premium or 75% of special male premium (Article 68). Some coupled payments for minor crops and processing aids also continued.

The 2008 Health Check integrated the partially coupled payments in the arable crops, olive oil and hops sectors into the Single Payment Scheme from 2010. Processing aids and most other coupled payments, including some specific payments in the beef sector, are integrated into the single payment scheme by 2012 at the latest. With the implementation of the Health Check agreement, the suckler cow and sheep and goat premia as well as payments for cotton will be the only formally coupled payments still allowed to remain in 2013.

The amounts available for coupled payments under the Health Check reform (either as partial coupled payments or under the specific support provisions in Article 68) are calculated annually by the Commission. The specified amounts for 2011 can be found here. The share of direct payments which are maintained coupled in 2011 is just under 7% (some minor payments for protein crops, nuts etc. but also cotton are not included). However, the percentages differ quite significantly across individual Member States, as shown in the diagram below.

Portugal, Belgium and Slovenia have the highest shares of coupled payments. For the old Member States, the main coupled payments are the suckler cow premia (Portugal, Belgium, Austria, France and Spain) while in the new Member States the main coupled payments relate to sugar and fruits and vegetables. Also of interest is the balance between residual coupled payments and specific supports introduced under Article 68. For countries to the right of the diagram, the main payments are those under Article 68. Overall, specific supports under Article 68 account for 2.6% of direct payments while residual coupled payments account for 4.0%.

Coupled payments under the Commission’s draft legislative proposal for direct payments post 2013

The main innovation around national envelopes in the draft Regulation is that Article 68 is replaced by a general provision to allow voluntary coupling where certain conditions are met. Member States can grant up to 5% of their national ceiling to sectors or regions where specific types of farming or specific agricultural sectors undergo certain difficulties and are particularly important for economic and/or social reasons. This proportion is increased automatically to 10% of their national ceiling for the new Member States or countries that have provided coupled support to suckler cows (Portugal, Belgium, Austria, France and Spain). If desired, these latter Member States can apply to the Commission to use an unrestricted proportion of their national ceiling for coupled payments provided they meet a series of conditions set out in the draft Regulation.

Furthermore, after 2016, all Member States can apply to increase the specified percentages (5% or 10%, respectively) that apply to them if they can show that an increase is necessary to meet these specified conditions. These conditions include:
- the necessity to sustain a certain level of specific production due to the lack of alternatives and to reduce the risk of production abandonment and the resulting social and/or environmental problems,
- the necessity to provide stable supply to the local processing industry, thus avoiding the negative social and economic consequence of any ensuing restructuring,
- the necessity to compensate disadvantages affecting farmers in a particular sector which are the consequence of continuing disturbances on the related market;
- where the existence of any other support available under the DP Regulation, the RD Regulation or any approved State aid scheme is deemed insufficient to meet the needs referred to in this Article.

As some of the existing coupled payments (sugar, fruits and vegetables) will lapse and be fully integrated into the decoupled payments scheme after 2012, these provisions would seem to give plenty of scope for Member States to maintain or even increase coupled payments after 2013. Particularly the inclusion of market disturbance as a justification for specific payments is a new departure, even if the scope of these measures is limited to maintaining the existing level of production but not increasing it.

On the other hand, Member States will lose the possibility to provide support to specific agricultural activities entailing agri-environment benefits under Pillar 1 (the current Article 68(1)(v)), while support for risk management schemes are also moved to Pillar 2. Whether any Member State will feel strong enough about these omissions to fight for their retention in Pillar 1 remains to be seen.

On 13 January, Dacian Ciolos gave testimony to the UK Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee on CAP reform.

Emphasis on international competition as a justification for income support

I don’t see how our agriculture can, at the same time, be competitive in the international market and have higher level of standards than farmers in other parts of the world.

But if we don’t have this minimum support for income and compensatory payments, the risk is that a lot of farmers who can be competitive without the crosscompliance rules that we have in Europe but not in other parts of the world-who in normal situations can be competitive-will not be competitive.

Active farmers

Ciolos showed strong commitment to the concept of ‘active farmers’. He stated one minimum requirement clearly. When asked whether he would “expect some agricultural goods to be produced for someone to be defined as an active farmer?”, Mr. Ciolos responded ‘Yes. If not, we cannot talk about agriculture or the farmer.’ But otherwise, he provided little substance on how a practical definition could look like, and he admitted:

We can’t expect to have a common definition at European level. This is why now the objective of the Commission is to come with, let’s say, a negative definition-who is not an active farmer-and then the Member States will define who is an active farmer, taking into account the specific situation at national level.

Cap on direct income support

Mr. Ciolos supported the idea of a cap. But when asked whether there is ‘a danger that the larger farm holdings will simpler reorganise themselves into smaller holdings to get around any cap’, he did not offer much clarification:

Especially with big farms, I don’t think their objective is only to have a big amount of payments from public money. I don’t think that we will have a very important phenomenon of the splitting or separation of farms only to have payments. I think a farmer uses other logic when he decides on the structure of production and farms, and is thinking not only about having a level of direct payments.

Small farms

The idea is not to increase direct payments for small farms, but to make them simpler, and then to propose a lot of instruments-like training, investment and organisation of production groups-in order to integrate the small farms more into the market than at present.

We propose to generalise decoupled payments in all Europe and to maintain coupled payments only in some specific regions, for some specific products.

Financial allocation within the first pillar

Q: ‘How do you envisage money being shared between the two main elements of the new direct payments-that is, basic income support and the greening component?’

We are analysing several scenarios, but I think we can go up to maybe one third of the direct payments being linked to the production and delivery of public goods of greening.

Q: ‘Are you considering basing the payment for greening activities in Pillar 1 on objective criteria, such as the additional cost of delivery or the environmental benefit?’

I can see that this part of the greening payments is exactly the level of the production costs for a farm that decides to integrate this measure. The objective, in fact, for us is to use this part of the payments to incentivise a farmer to do more, not only to have a payment in exchange.

Further remarks

The oral evidence shows nicely the broadly practiced art of claiming, at the same time, that the CAP creates no distortions in the international economy (‘I don’t think that we can now say that we influence the level of prices in countries in the south.’) and that similar levels of payment are needed within the EU to avoid distortions (‘Here we can have a distortion in the market if categories of farms have different treatment.’).

Mr. Ciolos denied again that there is any conflict between supporting the delivery of public goods and the standard of living of farmers.

Of course, I don’t think there’s a contradiction between these two objectives, but it will depend on the resources that we have for the Common Agricultural Policy.

I don’t think that there is a tension in the CAP between ensuring good standards of living of farmers and the delivery of public goods if the first Pillar of direct payment is reformed

He furthermore repeated the idea that agriculture is more affected by governmental regulation than other sectors:

It’s the only sector, I think, in Europe that has to play an economic role and plays a part in the market but, at the same time, has to integrate a lot of rules imposed by society. The automotive industry, the textile industry and other industries do not integrate a lot of expectations from people in the way that agriculture does.

I am sure that a list of the costs of regulatory compliance in the automotive industry with all its safety requirements and environmental standards would be quite long. Also, remember the compliance challenge for the chemical industry under REACH. And all the emission standards that affect industrial production in the EU (and which do not apply to imports). And all the legislation on work safety, healthy working conditions, employee rights and job security that affect large companies much more than small farms.

A last point:

I also remind you that the discussion in Doha was not blocked because of the resistance of the European Union, but because of the resistance of the other partners

It’s true: the recent stalemates have not been directly provoked by the CAP. But weak and conservative signals on agriculture from the EU at the beginning of the Doha-Round did quite a bit in bogging negotiations down. With a clear and early commitment from the EU that substantial agricultural liberalization is on the negotiating table, the Doha negotiations might have take a different path.

You can download the transcript here. Please note: The transcript is not yet an approved formal record of these proceedings. Any public use of, or reference to, the contents should make clear that neither members nor witnesses have had the opportunity to correct the record.

World food prices are on the rise again. In December 2010, they exceeded the dramatic peak they had reached during the global food crisis in 2007/08. Add to this threatening megatrends, such as population growth and climate change, and think of recent news about the severe drought in Russia or the once-in-a-century flooding in Australia, both major staple food exporters. Who wouldn’t get an uneasy feeling that the specter of famine might come to haunt Europe again?

The European Commission has concluded in its communication on the post-2013 CAP that the CAP must preserve the EU’s food production potential, ‘so as to guarantee long-term food security for European citizens’. Similarly, ministers of agriculture from 22 member states claim in their Paris Declaration that ‘only an ambitious, continent-wide policy can safeguard Europe’s independence’.

Surprisingly, however, there are no scenarios and no calculations to substantiate this perceived threat. Only the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) has conducted a Food Security Assessment. The lessons are clear-cut: there are no discernible dangers for the UK. In a recent working paper, I have looked at the entire EU.

EU food production per capita has constantly increased in the past and far outstrips dietary energy requirements. The share of income that households spend on food has steadily declined. By now, food prices are so low compared to income that even a 10-fold increase in the farm gate price of staple crops would be far off from provoking food scarcity in the EU. Forecasts predict roughly stable or increasing production quantities for the EU – even in the case of subsidy and tariff cuts. The expected main effect of climate change during the coming decades will be to shift production from southern to northern Europe without significantly curtailing overall production.

If food prices rose dramatically, the EU could increase the agricultural area used for growing cereals; in particular, by cutting back on biofuel and livestock production. Furthermore, agricultural labor and capital input could be multiplied. An additional measure would be to enhance investments into agricultural productivity.

The EU does thus not depend on imports for its food security. Still, it’s interesting to have a closer look at EU food imports. Since food prices are so low compared with EU wealth that the EU could afford sufficient imports even if prices rose tenfold (always speaking of basic staples, not caviar and passion fruit), only export restrictions could impair the EU’s import potential. A number of considerations show how unlikely this threat is.

Agricultural markets are becoming thicker: world food trade has increased by 230% between 2000 and 2008 according to the FAO. The greater the volumes, the more food can still be bought on the world market if a given amount of supplies is interrupted.

Export concentration has been low, or at least decreasing, during recent decades in the most important agricultural markets, as Defra notes in its Food Security Assessment. The concentration of countries’ share in world food exports matters because export restrictions are more lucrative and can be more easily upheld if most of the market is in the hands of one or few suppliers.

A significant share of EU imports comes from highly reliable exporters: the US, Switzerland, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. These countries could greatly expand their exports to the EU if the need arose. The other main source of exports to the EU, South America, is decently stable. The figure below shows the market shares of key exporters to the EU (it stems, as the following figures, from the DG Agri MAP newsletter).

Food is a homogenous good if the issue is not taste but calories. If exports of wheat were seriously curtailed, they could be replaced by rice, maize and other grains. Export restrictions are therefore less harmful to importers and less attractive to exporters.

Food is mostly traded on a spot market and can be easily transported. Food thus differs greatly from oil and gas where imports hinge on long-term contracts, pipelines and suitable refineries.

Food production in major exporting countries can be more easily increased than energy production (beyond currently available capacity) as the latter depends on long-term capital investments. If some suppliers restrict their exports, it is thus easier for their competitors to pick up market shares.

No prolonged and encompassing phases of export restrictions have occurred since the Second World War. Export restrictions taken during the 2007/08 price spikes were usually of short duration and limited to one or a few products.

The EU imports relatively little staple food. Most agricultural imports are either feedstuff (soya), ‘luxury’ products (coffee, tea, tobacco, sugar, exotic fruits, meat, food preparations) or products with multiple non-food uses (palm oil). The figures below show this at a highly aggregated level and for the main imported products.

All readers are cordially invited to discuss these issues at a lunch seminar at ECIPE in Brussels on January 26.

France has always played a pivotal role in the CAP. As a founder member of the EU, Europe’s largest agricultural economy and the biggest single beneficiary of CAP monies, it has a lot at stake. It is therefore fascinating to witness a violent power struggle within Nicolas Sarkozy’s government over the future of the policy.

On 18 October, French Environment Minister Jean-Louis Borloo and Sustainable Development Minister Chantal Jouanno put their names to a 16-page reform proposal that would see France’s current annual €10 billion a year in CAP payments be divided between basic income payments with environmental compliance (€3 billion), farmland conservation contracts (€6 billion) and food chain and price safety nets (€1 billion). This would be a radical redistribution. Currently 90 per cent of CAP spending in France is in the form of direct aids and market measures, with only ten per cent spent on farmland conservation and rural development.

For more detail on the proposals see Valentin’s earlier blog post.

Naturally, the publication of such a radical proposal was met with howls of dismay from the Ministry of Agriculture and its sponsors, the mainstream farm unions. Barely a month previously, the Agriculture Ministry had put its name to an altogether different, more conservative joint position with the German Agriculture Ministry. In the struggle that ensued, the environment ministers were forced to back-pedal and remove the offending document, even though it was warmly received by other stakeholders.

Nothing on the internet can ever be erased and the document is still available on the links below. It remains to be seen just which version of the French government position will prevail as we head into the next stage of the negotiations. French President Nicolas Sarkozy is said to have joked that France has two commissioners in the current college: Dacian Ciolos (agriculture) and Michel Barnier (single market). With a government so divided, perhaps he’ll need them.

Hat Tip: www.pouruneautrepac.fr

Downloads:

Proposal

Accompanying letter from Environment Minister Jean-Louis Borloo

In a smart move, the Ministry proposes to keep the current €10 billion CAP budget for France – thus making the proposals more appealing to its domestic audience – and it uses the budget issue as a stick/carrot: a large budget can only be justified for a green CAP.

The money is allocated to several instruments (doing away with the traditional two-pillar structure):

* €3 billion for direct income support, available to all farmers in the EU at an equal level, without any historic base. National governments could have the possibility to top up these payments. A flexible component could be introduced to soften fluctuation in prices and regional yields. The eco-conditionality (respect of good agricultural and environmental conditions) shall be tightened.
* €4 billion for environmental services, notably the protection of the climate, biodiversity and water. One part of these payments is available to all preferable farming systems (organic, high nature value, leguminous plants, foraging, low input). Another part is limited to special areas (less advantaged areas, Natura 2000 etc).
* €2 billion to boost the transition towards more sustainable farming. This covers the conversion to preferable farming systems, green investments, innovation and collective responses to local challenges.
* €0.5 billion for food policy. The objective is to promote high-quality, responsible and local consumption through labeling, consumer education, food stamps and investments, for instance in local markets.
* €0.5 billion for security nets and market intervention. Interestingly, the Ministry warns against blanket subsidies for insurances as this can push farmers towards high-risk, high-intensity farming. Only insurances that reward sound environment stewardship should be subsidized.

The Ministry also recalls the polluter pays principle and proposes to consider taxes on the harmful aspects of farming.

There are some elements that raise concern. One is the continuation of fully EU-financed direct payments. However, the proposed drastic cuts to the direct payments combined with stricter eco-conditionality make this tolerable. Another problematic point is the idea to move away from co-financing of agri-environmental measures towards full EU-financing. Furthermore, one phrase about renewed Community preferences (reduced market access for foreign farmers in French parlance) may raise concern (though it may also be discarded as conforming to French political correctness).

The actual proposals are incompatible with French claims to €10 billion: an EU flat-rate income support would bind most CAP money in member states that currently have low CAP entitlements, leaving little for the environmental objectives. And it would be difficult to justify why environmental payments in France – fully EU-financed as they supposedly serve European public goods – grossly exceed payments in other member states.

Despite some minor flaws and tactical compromises, this is a great document. It is amazingly out of line with the position established by the French Ministry of agriculture and espoused in the Franco-German position paper. Let us hope that other ministries of the environment have the same guts! Why not a Franco-German paper for a green CAP? Or even a joint declaration by 27 ministries of the environment?

The position paper can be downloaded in French here.

In late 2009, leading agricultural economists from all over Europe issued a declaration on ‘A Common Agricultural Policy for European Public Goods’. They proposed the abolition of market intervention and blanket income support to farmers, and outlined a more efficient, greener CAP. Since then, DG Agriculture, the European Parliament and many member states have adopted positions that closely stick to the status quo. Now a new declaration ‘For an Ambitious Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy’ has been published. All European economists who work on agricultural policy issues are invited to join the declaration online.

The declaration states:

The need for ambitious CAP reform: The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) fails to adequately fulfill important societal objectives: to enhance biodiversity and climate protection, improve water quality, preserve scenic landscapes, increase animal welfare, promote innovative, efficient farming and fair competition in the internal market, and avoid harming farmers abroad. The debate on the future of the CAP beyond 2013 presents the opportunity to significantly improve this policy.

Broad agreement among experts: The shortcomings of the current CAP and recommendations for more effective agricultural policies have been substantiated in numerous scientific publications. A group of leading agricultural economists from across Europe has issued a declaration on ‘A Common Agricultural Policy for European Public Goods’. National advisory bodies, such as the Scientific Advisory Council of the Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection in Germany and the Social and Economic Council in the Netherlands, have also called for far-reaching changes.

Policy-makers’ status quo bias: Unfortunately, decision-makers in agricultural policy appear unwilling to seize the opportunity for substantive reform. Their proposals intend to maintain the status quo to a large extent. A critical lack of reform ambition is manifest in the ‘Franco German position for a strong Common Agricultural Policy beyond 2013’, in the own-initiative ‘Report on the future of the Common Agricultural Policy after 2013’ by the European Parliament, and in the leaked Communication by DG Agriculture on ‘The CAP towards 2020: Meeting the food, natural resources and territorial challenges of the future’, among others.

Guiding principles for a new CAP: We call on policy-makers to pay less attention to special interests. For a future CAP that better serves the public interest, we recommend five guiding principles.

• Targeting on public goods: All subsidies should be closely linked to the provision of public goods. Any subsidy that is not differentiated according to farmers’ provision of public goods, such as the Single Farm Payment, should be progressively phased out. The alleviation of rural poverty should be a function of social and not agricultural policy.
• Environmental focus: Sustainable land use should become the key objective of the CAP. This includes biodiversity protection, climate change mitigation and responsible water management.
• Market orientation: Generally, well-functioning markets rather than state intervention are the best way to attain a demand-oriented, innovative and competitive farm sector. Great care should be taken that subsidies distort production and prices as little as possible. Export subsidies should be abolished.
• Global food security: The EU should promote global food security through an open trading system, support for agricultural productivity in developing countries, climate change mitigation and the preservation of its own sustainable production capacity. To enhance productivity, more public investment in research and development should be undertaken.
• Subsidiarity: The CAP should focus on objectives and policy instruments for which EU-wide coordination creates the greatest value added. It should be carefully examined where burden sharing between the member states and the EU, instead of full EU-financing, can be extended.

Policy-makers must show more reform ambition for the post-2013 CAP if they are serious about the Europe 2020 strategy and the EU’s high-level environmental commitments.

Here you can sign the declaration and see the list of signatories.

The summer break has come and gone and with the European Parliament back in session, Commissioners back from their yachts and their fonctionnaires back at their desks, the future of the EU budget is back in the spotlight.

As part of the December 2005 heads of government agreement on the 2007-2013 financial perspective it was agreed that there would be a midterm ‘budget review’ in 2008-09 which would look at all areas of the EU budget. including the two hottest political potatoes – the large share of funds going to the CAP and the British budget rebate. The review began with a big public consultation led by the then Budget Commissioner Dalia Grybauskaite, who pulled no punches in describing the budget as largely out of tune with Europe’s current and future challenges. However, she left the Commission early to become President of Lithuania and with delays to the Lisbon Treaty ratification the review process slowed to a standstill.

The future of the budget hit the headlines late last year with the leaking of an early draft of the Commission’s communication on the future of the budget. This suggested share going to the CAP and Europe’s regional policy needed scaling back to free resources for innovation, energy security, climate change and jobs. The document, which is understood to have been drafted by Commission President Barroso’s close advisers, was immediately disowned by a handful of outgoing Commissioners who saw it as a threat to their own budget lines.

We now learn that the Commission’s revised communication will be published in the first week of October (expect leaks before that). Budget Commissioner Janusz Lewandowski is said to favour “evolution over revolution” and in an interview with the German newspaper Handelsblatt the Commissioner suggested a reduction in the CAP budget. This week his officials have suggested the CAP budget could decline to around 33 per cent of the total (down from the current 40 per cent). MEPs with close links to farming lobbies are already raising the alarm. Irish MEP Mairead McGuinness said

“The Budget Commissioner sees a future with less spent on agriculture and more on research and innovation. His words are part of a softening up process, preparing the ground for a lower agriculture budget”

Yet Lewandowski is clearly taking a more cautious approach than previous Commissions. A decade ago the Prodi Commission suggested the CAP budget be cut to 30 per cent of the total EU budget. Prodi was eventually outmaneuvered by his own Agriculture Commissioner Franz Fischler and the CAP budget has increased each year since then with the bulk of it being ring-fenced up to 2013 under the terms of a deal made by French and German heads of government back in 2002.

Meanwhile, current Commission President Barroso, in his first ‘State of the Union’ address, steered clear of saying anything concrete on the future of the CAP that might frighten the horses. He called for “an open debate without taboos”, argued that the EU budget should be directed “where it leverages growth & delivers on our European agenda” and said that farm policy should contribute towards achieving global food security and the sustainable management of natural resources and reversing biodiversity loss.

One issue that looms large over the CAP is the possible extension of national co-financing, which applies to every other part of the EU budget, to CAP farm subsidies. This would help countries that are net contributors to the budget and might free up resources within the EU budget for other areas. It’s a move that seems to have been accepted by influential parliamentarians like Paolo De Castro MEP, chairman of the Agriculture Committee and is thought to be favoured by the French government.

In a possible sign of things to come in relation to co-financing, the Czech Republic government has decided that it will no longer make voluntary nationally-financed contributions to top-up CAP direct payments to Czech farmers and landowners. These optional payments have been taken up by all of the new member states during a transition period in which the EU funded contribution covers only a share of the total payments that can be made. The amounts involved have been substantial. In 2010, for example, the Czech government had topped up EU farm subsidy payments by €271 million. In the same year Poland topped up its farm subsidy payments by €1.1 billion, Hungary by €529 million and Bulgaria by €267 million.

There can be no doubt that if the CAP sees more national co-responsibility the idea of farm subsidies as ‘free money from Brussels’ will fade. Co-financing will focus minds in national finance ministries on whether voters would scarce national public funds should be spent on farm subsidies while cuts are being made in other areas like health, education, defence and housing.

The reformist zeal of the 15 professors in the German scientific advisory board on agriculture is remarkable, and their statement (in German) largely concurs with the declaration for ‘A Common Agricultural Policy for European Public Goods’ signed by experts from all across Europe half a year ago. The statement even goes beyond the recent proposals (in German) made by the German Advisory Council on the Environment (SRU): agricultural economists overtake environmental experts in their demands for CAP reform.

According to the scientific advisory board on agriculture, market price, direct income and farm-level investment support should be removed. There is no reason to fear a massive breakdown in EU agriculture: 61% of German agricultural area is rented out, so that large share of direct payments does not benefit farming anyway; bioenergy makes it increasingly attractive to continue farming; structural change will allow significant cost reductions to make farming more competitive; several agricultural sub-sectors are economically viable, and have been so for a long time, without receiving significant subsidies and tariff protection; the extra costs of higher EU standards are low for most farms (less than €50/ha); and targeted payments to maintain agriculture in areas threatened by undesirable land abandonment can compensate adverse effects.

Coping with fluctuating market prices will be a key entrepreneurial challenge for farmers – and not a cause for government intervention. Governments may have some role to play to address production risks that cannot be efficiently insured – especially with regard to droughts. However, adaptation to climate change falls again primarily into farmers’ responsibility, while governments should limit their activity to providing public goods (such as meteorological forecasts, research and innovation).

A sectoral approach tied to agriculture is not a suitable mechanism for regional development. Furthermore, responsibility for regional development should be shifted to lower levels of governance.

Significantly more funds should be dedicated to targeted public-goods programs. In addition to the traditional objectives of climate change and wildlife biodiversity, the importance of maintaining the diversity of the agricultural genetic pool is highlighted. It should be examined which of these public-goods policies are best integrated into the agricultural resort and which should be transferred to other ministries.

This is a world apart from the official German position, dated March 31, 2010, and agreed by the federal and Länder ministries. The ministries favor the status quo plus some more Health-Check style modifications. The two-pillar system with a strong first pillar, centered on direct income support, should be maintained. The CAP should be further simplified and remaining market interventions be reduced to a safety net. Socio-economic objectives should remain central. And the current distribution of subsidies across member states should be upheld.

When will these two worlds clash? So far, the Ministry of Economy (liberal, FDP) and the Finance Ministry (conservative, CDU) have been silent on CAP reform and left the issue largely to the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection (Bavarian conservatives, CSU). But the strain of the financial and economic crisis on public budgets – together with the growing public discontentment with Germany’s responsibility to pay for the EU and other member states’ deficits – makes a showdown inevitable.

The Rapporteur of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (ComAgri), George Lyon, has presented his take on the post-2013 CAP. Once the document has been discussed and amended by ComAgri, it will be voted upon first in ComAgri (June) and then in the EP plenary (July).

The starting point of the draft already chills expectations: “The Common Agricultural Policy has been largely successful in fulfilling the objectives it was set out to accomplish so far.”

Three groups of objectives are identified. 1) Supporting economic needs – including an EU agriculture competitive on world markets, EU food security in an unstable world context, and the valuable contribution EU agriculture and the downstream agri-food sector make to EU growth and employment.

2) Responding to social concerns – to enhance farmers’ incomes that are lower than the EU average in most member States and that decreased in 2009; to support the sustainable, dynamic and balanced socio-economic development of European rural communities; to attract younger generations to rural areas and activities; and to tackle rural unemployment.

3) Delivering benefits in terms of public goods – with a focus on the positive externalities of agriculture, justifying ‘a strong and well-supported CAP’.

From these objectives, the draft moves to an outline of future CAP measures and structures. The basic tenet is: keep things roughly as they are. Maintain some market measures as a safety net, continue with the Single Farm and the Less-Favored Area Payments, and uphold flexible spending entitlements that are fully community-financed (roughly corresponding to Art. 68). The current budget should also be kept, and co-financing limited to the sort of measures that currently fall under co-financing.

At some point, the report asks for the “maximisation of the delivery of environmental goods”. But this is misleading rhetoric. You can spend any Euro only once. If you want to serve many objectives and finance many measures that have nothing to be with environmental goods, you are leaving little for the environment.

For this draft, any argument is good enough if it results in payments to farmers. In the category “Supporting economic needs”, one objective is “corrections to market failures such as exposure to natural disasters, high risk and price volatility, lack of demand elasticity, farmers’ position as ‘price takers’ in the food chain, etc.” Since when are natural disasters a market failure? Or high risks, or a lack of demand elasticity? These are market conditions that determine how profitable a given sector is and who should be in this sector (according to how successful individual economic actors are in coping with these conditions). They can, in particular circumstances, give rise to market failures, and these market failures can, again in particular circumstances, justify efficient state action (which is unlikely to take the form of round-about income support or market intervention to support prices). But considering all these phenomena enumerated above as ‘market failures’ that somehow warrant the Single Farm Payment or price intervention is untenable.

What is most upsetting is that this draft comes from George Lyon, who happens to be a Liberal Democrat from the UK. These are the best reform credentials one could wish for. Once MEPs from other party groups and member states have introduced their amendments, the outcome will likely be worse.

But why would a Liberal Democrat from the UK write such a draft? Have a look at his homepage. Mr. Lyon was brought up in a seventh-generation tenant-farming family, occupied different positions within the National Farmers’ Union (NFU) starting in 1989, and had a stint as President of NFU Scotland in 1998-1999. He is hardly a special case. ComAgri MEPs frequently have close farming ties, which helps to explain why they overwhelmingly support a CAP that serves farmers first. If the EP wants to be worthy of its new powers in agriculture, it must intervene early and forcefully in the work of ComAgri.

1789: the people of Paris take the Bastille. 1848: republican upheaval all across Europe. 1917: the Communists take power in Russia. 2010: the European Socialists & Democrats declare that the CAP needs to be revolutionized. Admittedly, the S&D do not pretend to lay claim to quite such daring historical parallels – but there is no doubt that they make bold claims: the ‘one step at a time while maintaining the original philosophy’ approach of the 1992, 2000, 2003 and 2008/09 reforms has been ‘overly timid’. Explaining that progressives are those who anticipate and guide ambitious reform processes, whereas conservatives only tackle the issues when forced to do so by the emergence of crises or external constraints, they conclude that, ‘the reform of the CAP over the last 15 years has generally followed this second path.’

The S&D give two reasons a ‘New Start’ (yes, in capital letters, just like the ‘New Deal’ they are calling for) is imperative. The first is the common environmental public goods rationality (climate change, water management, renewable energy, biodiversity, soil erosion). The second is a combination of social concerns: reducing regional disparities, redirecting subsidies from the most competitive to more needy farm holdings, and creating employment (‘the granting of aid must absolutely be linked to job creation in rural areas in order to maintain, bring to life and develop the agricultural area in all regions of Europe’).

Concerns about employment and vitality in rural regions seem to point towards the strengthening of the non-agricultural component in rural development (Axes 3 of Pillar 2). But the document takes a most interesting turn in the opposite direction: the ‘hotchpotch’ of Pillar 2 should be cleared up, all CAP subsidies should be merged into one pillar, and all current CAP instruments that no longer fit should be transferred to the regional and cohesion policy.

I have a number of problems with the document. I am concerned about the objective of stimulating agricultural employment through the CAP and do not see the need to have a generalized payment link to natural handicaps. Furthermore, I very much like the extension of national co-financing of CAP subsidies, which the document rejects without further explanation.

Nevertheless, my overall assessment is strongly positive. The level of change envisioned is outstanding, and the general tone is rational/progressive (‘instruments must be better focused on objectives; priority must be given to expenditure that is more socially useful, such as financing of public goods made available to society; and handouts (direct subsidies) must be replaced with measures encouraging those involved to take account of the new requirements (new contractual approaches). Public subsidies should be given to farmers in return for their provision of environmental services and landscape management.’)

Comparing this statement to the stubborn defense of vested interests that is endemic in the EP Committee on Agriculture, it is a great step forward. And this is all the more important since Paolo De Castro, the chairman of the EP Committee on Agriculture, is a Socialist.

The author (pictured, below) is a former Member of the European Parliament and currently a Transatlantic Fellow of the German Marshall Fund of the US. He also has a small farm in Portugal. This is the first in a series of guest posts on capreform.eu.

You will understand that – minor as it might seem – the point that got most of my attention in the paper presented today by the Presidency of the European Council on Agriculture was the one on olive oil. After all, as an olive-oil farmer I have a vested interest on the issue, and therefore I was taken by surprise by reading that the Presidency considers “the authorisation of the private storage of olive oil in 2009, which contributed to a recovery in prices and subsequent market stabilisation” as an example of the success of the existing market control mechanisms.

As I am being paid 50% of the price I received for my olives a couple of years ago – 30 cents a kilo instead of 60 – I have some difficulties getting the point of the Presidency. It is true that when I started harvesting back in November, the local buyer told me he could not guarantee more than 24 cents the kilo, which would probably not cover harvesting costs, and so he presented his 30 cents offer as a generous move.

In the Brussels world of free competition, I could sell my olives to somebody else, but in the real world of Vale do Vargo, the only competitor is a co-operative that is practically bankrupt and pays for your olives in kind (gives you olive-oil in return) which is not a very practical form of payment. In the neighbouring village the local co-operative closed long ago, and several practicalities make it difficult for me to deliver my olives to longer distances.

So, I could think of milling the olives myself, or I could think of asking my south-eastern neighbour to mill them for me. But, well, all the traditional olive mills have been closed, according to the national authority’s explanation, because of Brussels directives. In fact, Brussels directives only told member states that waste water resulting from the milling process of olives should be correctly disposed of, and this did not mean closing down hundreds if not thousands of olive mills across the country, but Portuguese national bureaucracy saw here another golden opportunity to “modernise” by decree this old-fashioned rural country and made a very restrictive interpretation of the directive.

My short farming history started exactly when I was nominated for a report on olive-oil in the Budgets Control Committee of the European Parliament and I got so fascinated with the various dimensions of the issue that I decided to see for myself how to deal with olive groves. I never thought of my olive trees as a business, but as a hobby. Nevertheless, I expected it would be much less expensive than it turned out to be. As I soon understood, many of the olive groves around my own are held as a hobby by people working in nearby towns or villages. They have a small plot of land, something like one or two “sortes” – over there it means from 2,5 to 7 hectares – they take care of them on weekends and they are very happy if the payment for olives will cover their costs, excluding their voluntary work.

Normally this is a population that likes to keep old ties with inherited land or inherited rural habits, and that is emotionally involved with the farming cause, as much as if their livelihood would significantly depend on these plots of land. Then you have those who still make a living out of these traditional olive groves, and they must explore at least some 30 hectares of land. They keep traditional olive trees, but they already use mechanical collection and a lot of chemicals with which they kill all existing vegetation between olive trees and combat major pests. Sometimes they irrigate their olives as well.

The past years have been dramatic for this group. After severe droughts that limited production they now face sharp drops in prices. In the last five to ten years most of the olive grove scenery of Southern Alentejo changed dramatically, with the implantation of huge intensive olive oil groves. Invariably using irrigation, they multiplied by a factor of five to ten the number of olive trees per hectare, although using young and small olive trees that will not be allowed to get old. These new farms use more efficient olive-picking machines and the same chemical approach as the traditional commercial farms.

Most of the new olive groves were planted by Spanish investors, and because of the overall economic crisis, investment dried up in 2008, and several of these olive groves are for sale. Up to 2007/2008 – that is before these new olive groves started producing – the Portuguese olive-oil production was steadily declining, as in the absence of major modernisations, traditional production was just uncompetitive. This situation had, however, a positive aspect: prices remained firm. As the Portuguese consumer gives a premium to Portuguese olive oil and the national production was far below national demand, there was a premium for the national olives.

As the European Commission has been subsidising private storage of olive oil and – unless there will be bad climatic conditions – everything points to a steady increase of olive production for the next few years, I believe the private storage that the Presidency’s paper presents as the symbol of success in the intervention of markets will certainly play a role in damping future prices. It is awkward that a Presidency that happens to coincide with the largest European olive oil producer member state does not even consider the possibility that what I am presenting here as my personal analysis may become a reality.

If we were to analyse carefully the effect of the use by the EU of massive storage measures – milk products, beef, and grains – when the problem was more structural than short-term, I think we would confirm my point of view. What my accidental farming experience together with my administrative, political and academic experience tell me is that we are facing a structural challenge that has to be considered in several angles: technical modernisation; environmental impact in water, erosion, biodiversity and landscape management; rural policy; budget and budget control issues and food quality.

In our Mediterranean conditions, a traditional olive grove – intermingled with fig and almond trees, cork and green oaks – with centenary olive trees where you can easily find bees-nests, lizards, all sorts of insects and birds, even refuge for rabbits, with a lot of other species of plants in between where you occasionally spot hares, pheasants or wild boars is a wonder of nature. In the past, it allowed the presence of the “gland pigs” – that strive better in oak forests, but that go as well on olive groves – that would eat grass and plants, the figs and the fallen olives – and thus preventing the reproduction of pests like the fruit fly – alternating with lambs that would eat the grass and occasionally would prune the unwanted lower branches of olive trees. The main problem is that you need to give a close eye on what these animals are doing to prevent them misbehaving, and this is time consuming and less competitive than the alternative of spraying chemicals around.

Hand-picking of olives has been out of the question for quite some time and the standard traditional method has been for many decades to hit the trees with a stick, and collect the olives with a net by the ground. This is quite a rude method that destroys the productive capacity of the tree and is still time-consuming. Lately, huge machines that help shaking the tree have been used, but this is much more cumbersome, expensive and time-consuming than to have small aligned olive trees that you can handle like a fruit tree orchard.

As decoupling of aids from production only very recently and still partially arrived at olive production, and decoupled payments are made on the basis of historic production, the Common Agricultural Policy actually became a further disadvantage to the traditional olive grove, as it gets a much smaller subvention than the intensive one.

So objective technical and market conditions – reinforced instead of balanced by the CAP – made impossible to the traditional olive groves to compete with the new intensive ones. The new, intensive olive groves were classified by a DG-Environment European Commission report as the number one cause for soil erosion in Spain, washing annually millions of tones of earth from the fragile Mediterranean soil to the sea. They also represent a drain on scarce water resources, they have a negative effect on biodiversity and, last but not least, they are not beautiful in the landscape as the old ones are.

But if these obvious failures of policy were not important enough, the budget control framework of the European legislation made things considerably worse. Either because the Commission once proposed to replace the payments per olive quantity by a payment per olive tree – proposal flatly refused by the industry – or for some other less transparent reason, the budget control mechanisms of the Commission rely solely on counting the number of olive trees.

As an explanation for this extraordinary practice, the Commission said that counting the number of trees was an indirect way of counting olives, assuming approximate fixed productivities per tree in each particular region. This is sheer nonsense for two reasons: the first is that the main variable on which productivity depends is the intensification degree, not the region where an olive grove is situated; the second is that with extensive methods variability is very high depending on climate variations.

However it goes beyond belief the enormous amounts of effort and public funds put behind this absurd task of counting olive trees. Brussels gossips – completely out of the blue – were that plastic trees were being planted in Italy to deceive the controllers. This would have been double foolishness, as a real olive tree is cheaper than a plastic one and no-one ever got a cent from the European Budget for having an olive tree, but only from producing olives, and plastic trees do not produce them as real olive trees do. The first thing I was told when I bought my olive grove was that I should be very careful in stating a number of trees considerably lower than reality. Otherwise, I would risk seeing the controllers coming, deciding several of my olives were not in good production capacity and condemn me as a fraudster. In the olive oil business fraud comes from making olive-oil without olives, not olives from plastic or almond trees, as it is apparently reasoned by the Commission.

Fraud in olive oil traditionally attains alarming levels, much higher than in milk products or wine, two of the other traditional victims. According to a press report I quoted in a Parliamentary question to the Commission, falsification of olive oil reach 50% levels in some European markets. The Commission was not impressed, and answered this was a detail for member states to be concerned with.

From all of this, I think we can understand what should be done on this sector, quite differently from what as been done lately.

1. Limit market intervention to exceptional circumstances. Do not make a system out of it. If the crisis situation lasts, think of structural measures;

2. Phase out existing subventions and replace them by a system that rewards olive production for (1) biodiversity enhancement; (2) soil conservation and (3) water saving;

3. Promote or subvention research in technologies that will increase human productivity with extensive use of natural elements;

4. Promote or subvention the personal or collective use of machinery that replace burning and pesticides.

5. Couple these measures with rural policy and social policy towards those who will not be able to keep the market competition pressure, as Sicco Mansholt thought necessary from the beginning.

6. Make war on those who make olive-oil without olives, stop harassing farmers for ludicrous reasons;

7. One of the last but very important decisions of former Commissioner Fisher Böel was to send her staff for visits in the countryside. Enlarge the measure to the other European institutions, everyone being invited to reflect all of these issues walking along old olive groves… Be my guest!

In the first of a series of video conversations with leading figures in the debate over the future of the CAP, Jack Thurston talks to Paolo De Castro MEP, chair of the parliament’s Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development and a former two-term Italian agriculture minister and professor of agricultural economics.

De Castro explains that he has always regarded himself as a CAP reformer and sets out his vision for a reshaping of the EU’s farm subsidy system. He advocates a shift to a basic flat rate aid payment to farmers, plus additional funds to be allocated at the discretion of member states. He argues for introducing minimum and maximum thresholds for payments (a minimum around 300 euro and a maximum in the range 400,000-500,000 euro). He speaks in favour of co-financing of the CAP, so long as it’s not optional for member states. He explains his vision for the European Parliament’s role under the new Lisbon Treaty rules, including his idea of a permanent seat for the Agriculture Committee on the Agriculture Council and how he’d like COMAGRI to take part in CAP comitology.

CAP Reform Conversations: Paolo De Castro MEP from farmsubsidy.org on Vimeo.

The German Council for Sustainable Development has just published a report highlighting the environmental damage caused by intensive agriculture and calling for a reform of the CAP direct payments system. It proposes a three-fold structure of payments: an environmental basic payment, a series of targeted agri-environmental payments for farmers who accept higher obligations, and a series of payments for high nature-value areas where the continuation of agricultural production is desirable but threatened on economic grounds.

For the environmental basic payment, it suggests that eligibility would be conditional on farmers turning over at least 10% of their area to environmentally-friendly husbandry with a view to maintaining a high level of biodiversity in the agricultural landscape throughout the EU.

The Council explicitly argues against the idea that farmers should be remunerated for fulfilling their statutory obligations with respect to the environment, animal welfare and food safety (cross compliance). It also justifies full EU financing of most of the payments “so long as these are directed to fulfilling EU objectives”, thus apparently advocating that some of the existing co-financed agri-environmental payments in Pillar 2 might be moved to Pillar 1 at least as far as financing modalities are concerned.

The report provides an excellent summary of the state of the debate on the environmental implications of agricultural policy (in German only, at least for the moment).

Read it here. Google Translate renders a passable English version of the press release for non-German speakers here.

Nothing tells you that a big political debate is hotting up like the emergence of new alliances of odd bedfellows. Yesterday saw a major joint intervention from two of Europe’s biggest, most authoritative and well-connected players in EU agriculture policy.

Birdlife International is a global partnership of conservation organisations. The Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, its member in the UK, boasts well over a million members. The European Landowners Organization is a federation of farmer and landowner associations. Both Birdlife and ELO have members and affiliates in each of the EU’s 27 member states.

They have come together in support of new ‘joint position’ for the future of the CAP. It is based around seven core principals. At its heart is a recognition that agriculture policy should be reoriented towards supporting the active land management practices that are needed to protect the landscape, the environment, preserve biodiversity and ensure for the long term Europe’s capacity to continue as a major producer of food.

The joint position stresses the need for a common European policy backed by money raised at a European level on the grounds that many aspects of land management require a cross border approach, e.g. water basins that span national boundaries, wildlife species that migrate long distances and seas that lap on the shores of more than one country. Moreover, within a the European common market for food, policies that have a bearing on food production should not operate in a way that distorts free competition. Birdlife and ELO also argue that solidarity among European nations of widely different levels of affluence and a shared concern for the future of the unique European tapestry of landscape and rural heritage is justification for a common European policy financed from a common budget.

The joint position is frank in its admission that despite a measure of evolution since it was founded in the early 1960s and some changing rhetoric, when it comes to how the €55 billion a year of CAP money is actually spent, it is still “a policy tuned to supporting agricultural commodity production”. It goes on to argue that the CAP must leave behind its commodity production past and embrace to a future in which “public expenditure matches, as much as possible, the delivery of public benefits which are vital for achieving both food and environmental security”.

Birdlife has been a pioneer of the “public money for public goods” mantra that looks certain to dominate at least the semantics of the upcoming CAP reform debate, if not the actual policy content. (Public goods have a very clear definition in economic theory but the term is increasingly thrown around without much precision, even by those who should know better, such as three analysts from the IEEP, who in a recent report, define agricultural public goods so widely as to remove any analytical power from the concept.) That a big, mainstream farm union like the ELO should throw its weight behind the public goods argument, and nail its flag to the Birdlife mast, is a significant achievement for the conservation group. It also suggests that the ELO has made a strategic calculation that the public money for public goods will be the defining logic of the next CAP reform, and it is better to get ahead of the argument than be left behind.

Making the opposite strategic choice is the UK’s National Farmers Union which is perhaps not surprising since the NFU’s main competition for members comes from the ELO affiliate the Country Land and Business Association (CLA). With Birdlife and the CLA even putting in a cordial joint appearance on the influential BBC Radio 4 Today Programme, the NFU’s Tom Hind reacted angrily to their joint position, dismissing the public goods argument as ‘naive’ and ‘old school’. For the NFU, the recent volatility of food prices means the next CAP reform should see the policy sharpen its focus on boosting commodity production. Some might regard this as a ‘pre-school’ approach.

Today the NFU issued a further reaction in the form of a press release in which its President Peter Kendall denounces the Birdlife/ELO position and reaffirms the NFU commitment to a CAP aimed squarely at commodity production and cheap food. Over the past few years successive NFU leaders have made the case for remuneration for public goods provided by agriculture (even the NFU’s EU-level partner COPA/COGECA has begun talking in these terms). So this more traditional perspective brings the NFU much closer to the positions taken by continental farm unions like the FNSEA in France.

Putting the UK sideshow to one side, the joint position sets out some of the policy implications of the high level argument for a CAP aimed at long term environmental and food security. It argues that High Nature Value farming, for example extensive grazing livestock farms, is badly neglected by the current CAP and should get a much larger share of taxpayer support, at the expense of more modern, resource-intensive and commercially-viable production systems such as feedlot livestock-rearing and monoculture cereal farms. During the question and answer session of the launch of the joint position in the European Parliament, I put it to Allan Buckwell, policy director of the ELO, that the plan would involve a major redistribution of subsidies and this could be politically toxic. Buckwell was admirably frank in agreeing that the plan would involve significant redistribution of support and made it clear the ELO was not in the business of defending the current allocation of CAP funds.

For a statement from a leading European farm union, the ‘joint statement’ is remarkable in that its contains the weakest possible defense of the market mechanisms (support prices, intervention buying and export subsidies) and direct aids of the first pillar of the CAP:

“Pillar 1 has certain strength in its relatively administrative simplicity and in the strong element of certainty and revenue stability it gives farmers.”

The ‘joint position’ contains no reference to measures to ensure price stability nor does it argue for the continuation the current system of direct income support for farmers. However, it is implicit that paying farmers for the provision of public goods does provide them with a valuable new income stream to supplement what they get from the marketplace. Both Allan Buckwell and RSPB’s Gareth Morgan made this point during the question and answer session.

Nevertheless, it is striking that first pillar of the CAP, which still takes up well over three quarters of the current budget, is well and truly hung out to dry. The joint position states that the mechanisms and measures of a reformed CAP “are likely to show more characteristics of the current CAP rural development and agri-environment measures than current support measures”. These characteristics are listed as follows: (1) a contractual basis of payments that lists the public goods the recipient of public funds is expected to produce in return for the public money paid, (2) transparency of both the funding and the contractual commitments, (3) targeting of specific outcomes and results that are quantifiable and measurable, (4) monitoring of performance and adaptation of policies in the light of outcomes, (5) accountability of recipients of EU funds and the national and regional authorities responsible for implementing EU policies and spending EU funds.

It is a sign of changing times that the ELO and Birdlife International are able to see eye-to-eye on the fundamental principals of a new CAP. In my view, they are on the right side of most of the big issues and the ELO has clearly stolen a march on the more traditional farm unions who would prefer to line up in defense of the status quo. My colleague Valentin Zahrnt has argued that BirdLife is makinge a mistake geting into bed with the ELO. I disagree. It’s not possible to achieve radical reform of the CAP without buy-in from the more progressive of Europe’s farmers and land managers.

Either way, there is no doubt that this will be seen a very important intervention as this year’s debate on the next CAP reform gets going. Read the joint position here

When the Lisbon Treaty came into force on 1 December 2009, one of the big winners was the European Parliament which gained equal status with the Council of Ministers in most EU decision-making, including for the first time agricultural policy-making (although with some ambiguity about its role in setting prices and aid levels to which Wyn Grant has drawn attention). There is considerable interest in whether these new powers will be used to promote or block CAP reform. The pessimistic view is that the EP will become the focus of intense sectoral lobbying which will be used to block reform.

Some light may be thrown on the way the EP will exercise its new legislative role by looking at trade policy, another area where the Parliament gained new powers under the Lisbon Treaty. Currently, the EU-South Korean Free Trade Agreement, which was negotiated under the old Nice Treaty rules, is up for ratification under the new Lisbon rules. According to a report in EUObserver, there is a possibility that the EP could reject the agreement, in large part because of lobbying by European small car manufacturers.

The EUObserver report notes that a debate in the Parliament next week will throw light on the stance of the European legislature, with observers predicting support or opposition is likely to fall along national rather than political lines. One MEP, Christofer Fjellner, a member of the parliament’s trade committee and a supporter of the agreement is quoted: “It would be very disturbing if the first thing the European Parliament does with its new powers is to take special interests to heart and increasingly act in a protectionist way.”

A signpost of things to come in agricultural policy ?

Five leading European farming and environmental NGOs, who between them boast several million members, have jointly published a blueprint for a new Common Agricultural Policy. In an unusual and very modern step, they have published a draft proposal and opened it for consultation. They will produce a final version in 2010. The proposal, which runs to 28 pages, is for a radical reorientation of the CAP away from a productivist and income support model towards a ‘public money for public goods’ ethos. [...]

You can read here the agreed communiqué from the 22 countries which were invited by France to discuss the future of the CAP in Paris yesterday. The meeting itself was surrounded by some controversy given that 5 member states (UK, Sweden, Denmark, Netherlands and Malta) were not originally invited, although the UK did send along a civil servant as an observer. The French Agriculture Minister Bruno Le Maire talked at length about the objectives of the meeting in an extensive interview with Le Monde.

The countries attending were those which had supported the call by France and Germany for stronger measures to support dairy farmers in October this year. The meeting took place in the shadow of the start of the debate on the next financial perspective, and was in part a reaction to the leaked Commission reflections in October on the parameters for the next financial perspective, which foresaw a substantial reduction in the CAP budget.

However, the Declaration itself is merely a restatement of well-known views on the role played by European agriculture in Europe’s economy and society and adds nothing to the debate. As Ministers departed, it was clear that they were unable to draw up any list of concrete conclusions and demands. As Minister Le Maire ruefully noted: “It’s not easy to reach an accord within 22 states that defend their different options”

The Spanish Presidency which begins on 1 January has announced that it will hold two councils devoted to reflections on the future of the CAP which may give more opportunity for all member states to set out their views.

At various times in the history of the CAP, member states have formed informal groupings to address particular issues, e.g., ‘the Aachen Five’ and the agri-monetary system. The G-21, in effect led by France, is a much larger grouping which constitutes a qualified majority in the Council. It become the G-21 rather than the G-20 at a meeting in Vienna when Greece joined. This left only the four leading reform countries (UK, Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden) outside the grouping, plus Cyprus and Malta – countries that have small farm sectors and may not have thought it worth the time and effort. [...]

I’ve always found the notion of ‘agricultural economists’ a curious one. As if the normal rules of economics don’t apply to agriculture and there’s need for a special discipline of agricultural economics. In universities agricultural economists are often housed in their own special departments, separate from the regular Economics department. I wonder if this alternate universe of agricultural economics might explain the state of agriculture policy, whether in the EU, the US or elsewhere. Anyway, today a group of agricultural economists from 22 EU countries has come out in favour of radical reform of the Common Agricultural Policy. [...]

Until recently, I have walked through Brussels with this grey-blue bag that all participants of the 2008 budget review conference received. In the meantime, it has fallen apart, and I don’t have anything to replace it. This is somewhat similar to the CAP & EU budget debate: the 2008 conference presenting the results of the consultation process briefly attracted broad attention, but subsequently, the debate fizzled out and was overwhelmed by the financial and economic crisis. [...]

The final paragraph of Commissioner Fischer Boel’s valedictory leaflet is revealing and foreshadows the debate that has yet to surface about the future of the CAP after 2013, the end of the current financial perspective. Mrs Fischer Boel makes the case for maintaining a common European agriculture policy among the EU’s 27 member states, presumably funded from the EU budget, as it is now. [...]

Euractiv reports on the creation of a new Franco-German working group to frame reform of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) after 2013. France has a new Agriculture Minister in Bruno Le Maire, who wasted no time in setting out his stall in meetings with Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso. [...]

The debate on the future of the CAP after 2013 has now started following the informal Farm Council in the Czech Republic earlier this month. Those who want to influence the debate have about twelve months before the Commission publishes a Communication (effectively a White Paper) on future policy in the summer/early autumn of next year. Formal legislative proposals will then be published in the middle of 2011 together with the proposals for the financial perspectives from 2014 to 2019 or 2020. [...]

France is Europe’s agricultural powerhouse and when it comes to the CAP, it is probably the single most influential member state. So what France thinks is of central importance to the future of EU farm policy. It is therefore good to see the publication of the latest of the national reform profile series at the CAP2020 website, run by the respected Institute for European Environment Policy. [...]

The Czech Minister for Agriculture has issued a press release summarising the discussion at the informal agricultural council in Brno today. The subject was the future shape of a simplified system of direct payments and a more even distribution that would result in a fairer competitive environment on the single market. Even allowing for translation issues and the usual blandness of official press releases, this is a particularly opaque example of the genre.

According to the release, the Ministers brought agreement on the issue of the importance of direct payments as well as creation of a new Common Agricultural Policy after 2013. The Ministers further committed to address the issue of unequal levels of payments to EU Member States. The reference to a new Common Agricultural Policy after 2013 creates interesting possibilities if indeed this is what is meant. [...]

Pillar 1 subsidies are likely to continue after 2020, forecast Professor Allan Buckwell, the Policy Director of the Country Land and Business Association, in an interesting talk at the President’s Seminar of the Royal Agricultural Society of England (RASE) in London yesterday. [...]

The four main farm unions of the United Kingdom today unveiled a joint manifesto aimed at the June elections to the European Parliament. The slim, 8 page document sets out a UK farmers’ agenda on a range of issues of concern. While the manifesto makes the case for lighter touch regulation of farming (e.g. on pesticides, nitrates, greenhouse gas emissions, soil degradation and health issues like BSE) it calls for more powerful regulation of the food chain to defend farmers incomes. When it comes to the future of the CAP it seems that the major concern is to prevent the ‘re-nationalisation’ of the policy. [...]

Recently, I attended a conference of the British Land Use Policy Group (LUPG) on ‘Securing our Common Future through Environmentally Sustainable Land Management – Vision for the Future of the CAP post 2013′. The first speaker noted that ‘the challenge of the next months is to identify the questions for CAP reform’. Toward the end, a commentator from the floor summarized the discussion: ‘We had a lot of questions and not many answers.’ Should we really place ourselves at such an early, exploratory stage where we struggle to grasp the main dimensions of the problems, at best determine broad directions for reform? [...]

Earlier this week I was invited to take part in a round table discussion, as part of a major conference on the future of the CAP, organised by Birdlife/SEO and WWF. The conference began with a joint presentation by SEO and WWF of an interesting new proposal for CAP reform in Spain. The proposal envisages an end to Pillar 1 by 2019 and the transfer of all CAP funds to an environmental and rural policy oriented around the principle of ‘public money for public goods’, by which is meant those environmental ’services’ provided by farmers, particularly in areas of high nature value (HNV) farming such as upland pastures and native grasslands. [...]

The latest Journal of Common Market Studies (vol.47, 2, March 2009) contains an important article exploring the determinants of CAP reform. It is written by Alan Swinbank, a distinguished agricultural economist and a leading proponent of reform and Arlindo Cunha who was chair of the Agriculture Council in 1992 at the time of the MacSharry reform. [...]

If there was a jewel in the crown of the CAP health check deal agreed last November it was probably the decision to phase out milk quota between now and 2015, with a one per cent increase in quota each year. But this prize is now under threat as several powerful EU member states led by Germany have argued at today’s Agriculture Council meeting that the reform should be postponed. [...]

I realise that opposition politicians have to say all things to all persons and jump on any bandgwagon that’s going on, but I must say that I found an interview with Nick Herbert, the shadow Defra secretary, in Farmers Weekly a bit disappointing. It remains to be seen whether the MP for Arundel and South Downs will be Defra secretary in David Cameron’s Conservative government, or even whether Defra will remain in his present form. However, if his thinking is typical of that in the shadow cabinet on agriculture and food matters, it’s a bit worrying. It looks as if we could be lurching back towards productionism. [...]

The influential Land Use Policy Group will be launching their vision for the future of the CAP after 2013 in Brussels on March 30th. This will be an important event in the long-term effort to clarify thinking about future policy so that it delivers benefits to the environment and rural communities. [...]

You will be forgiven for wondering why things have been a little on the quiet side here at CAPHealthCheck.eu over the past couple of months. For my part, besides some intensive behind-the-scenes work at farmsubsidy.org and and exciting new EU budget transparency project that’s still under wraps, I’ve been blogging more on the EU budget than on the CAP, mostly over at FollowTheMoney.eu. Among the other leading contributors to this website, Wyn Grant has been on a fact-finding visit to Australia and Alan Matthews has been attending to his teaching responsibilities as well as working away on his forthcoming magnum opus on the CAP and global development. Fear not, we will be back in the saddle soon enough, but while things are running at a little below full capacity, you might want to take a look over at an excellent new website/blog called CAP2020: Debating the future of the Common Agricultural Policy. [...]

Last week I posted five reasons why it is hard to justify spending 30 billion euros each year on the Single Payment Scheme. Here are five more reasons. [...]

With the Health Check out of the way, it looks as if the medium-term future of the CAP is going to be strongly influenced by discussions of how the EU budget should be spent. This always raises the awkward question of the opportunity cost of spending large sums of money on subsidising farmers.
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Commissioner Mariann Fischer Boel’s proposal for five annual dairy quota increases of 1 per cent each, adopted unchanged by farm ministers, is under attack from two sides. The Commission believes that this is a sure sign that it has negotiated a fair middle path through a morass of conflicting objectives. A less charitable interpretation would be that the needs of an internationally competitive industry have been partially sacrificed to those of marginal farmers with political clout. [...]

A charming young Estonian woman greeted me at the European Parliament yesterday when I went to give evidence to the Agriculture and Rural Development Committee (of which more in due course). Of broader significance Estonia is probably the only new member state with a clear concept of how the CAP should evolve. This is outlined in an Agra Focus interview with farm minister Helir-Valdor Seeder. [...]

Today’s meeting of the Agriculture Council witnessed the frequently irrestistable force of French attachment to the Common Agricultural Policy run into the occasionally immovable object of UK, Swedish and new member state desire for change. The result was that a much-trumpeted French vision paper for the future of the CAP beyond 2013 was roundly rejected. In the end France used it’s presidential prerogative to adopt the paper as ‘Presidency conclusions’ but as such it has no political weight whatsoever. Some will remember that UK vision paper for the CAP lauched in the final weeks of its own EU presidency at the end of 2005 met a similar fate. [...]

With the health check done and dusted, European agriculture policymakers turn to the bigger questions of the future of the CAP after the current EU financial perspective, which ends in 2013. Ever since the Chirac-Schroeder deal of 2002, which fixed the overall CAP budget and allocation of direct payments for the subsequent eleven years, there has been no serious debate about whether agriculture policy should continue to consume upwards of 50 billion euros a year and whether the current instruments are able to meet current and future challenges. To help shed light on the debate, the Institute for European Environment Policy has this week launched a new website, called CAP2020.
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Later today Stefan Tangermann will step down as Director of the OECD Trade and Agriculture Directorate, a post he has held since 2002. The OECD has a strict ‘retire-at-65′ rule and it may surprise some to learn that the tall and spritely German, invariably sporting one of his trademark bow-ties, has reached such an age. Professor Tangermann has been a colossus among European agriculture policy analysts for at least two decades. Before taking the job at the OECD he was professor of agricultural economics at the University of Göttingen, having been appointed to that position in 1980.
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This detailed document does not yet appear to have been published on the Council or Commission websites. But you can download it here in Word format.

Roger Waite, Editor of Agra Facts, gives the inside story on the all-night negotiations that led to a deal early this morning (20th November) on the health check of the CAP. He explains how the negotiations were handled, that the big winners were Italy, Germany and France and that at key moments there was intervention from several heads of government. He also explains that the United Kingdom was joined by several of the new member states who were not able to fully endorse to the final agreement.

According to Roger the biggest surprises were a new milk fund and the decimation of the progressive element to its plan to redirect farm subsidies from direct aids to funds for farmland conservation and rural economic development.

Unanimity, like pregnancy, has a binary quality. A decision can’t be ‘virtually unanimous’. But this is just how French farms minister Michel Barnier described this morning’s final compromise agreement on the health check package. So which of the EU 27 member states were unable to acquiesce in the deal? My sources tell Roger Waite tells me it was the UK plus three others (I assume Denmark, Sweden and perhaps the Netherlands or Estonia) Lithuania, Latvia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia [update: and Estonia]. Can well-informed readers offer some further illumination? [...]

With the ink barely dry on the Council of Ministers’ final compromise deal on the health check, leading members of the European Parliament are laying into each other after a day of chaotic voting on the Parliament’s approach to the CAP. In a podcast interview yesterday, Paulo Casaca MEP (Socialist Group) told me that the Parliament was ‘lost’ and suffering from a lack of political leadership, something he thought could come from the Commission or from within the Parliament itself. Meanwhile Neil Parish MEP, chairman of the Agriculture Committee and a senior member of the right-leaning European Peoples Party – European Democrats grouping, voted against his own committee’s report and against the EPP-ED position. [...]

European farm ministers have reached a deal on the CAP health check. The principal points are these:

* Five annual milk quota increases of 1% each with effect from April 2009, prior to total abolition of the quota system as from April 1 2015 (unchanged from Commission proposal). As is now traditional, when it comes to milk quota, Italy will receive a special derogation that allows it to increase its quota by the full 5% in the first year.

* The rate of modulation (shifting funds from direct aids to rural development aids) will be raised from 5% at present to 10% by 2012. The increase will be made gradually: 7% in 2009, 8% in 2010, and 9% in 2011. The progressive modulation concept has been watered down; only recipients of more than €300,000 will face a higher modulation rate: 4 per centage points higher than the standard rate. The resulting money will be allocated for ‘new challenges’ – climate change, energy, biodiversity and water management but will it will also have to fund “accompanying measures” for the dairy sector.

This looks like a setback for the Commission, which had hoped to ‘walk the talk’ on increasing the emphasis on targeted policies like farmland conservation and rural economic development over traditional farm handouts.

The Commission’s green paper of November 2007 floated the idea of a basic modulation rate of 13% by 2013, rising to 23% on payments over 100,000 euros, 38% on payments above 200,000 euros and 58% on payments above 300,000 euros. By May 2008 the Commission had scaled back its ambitions to a basic modulation rate of 13% by 2013, rising to 22% on payments above 300,000 euros. Today the Council has agreed a basic modulation rate of 10% in 2013, and that there should be no intermediate bands of higher modulation, with just a 14% band for payments above 300,000 euros.

According to previous impact assessments, the budgetary effect of this is to transfer 1.2 billion euros for rural development by 2013 (less than this in the earlier years). This is from a total direct payments pot of some 36 billion euros a year. As a rule of thumb, each percentage point of modulation skims off 200 million euros a year.

This represents a victory for those who want to preserve the CAP as a system of income entitlements for landowners and a defeat for those who want to see public money targeted at public goods.

* The existing partial coupling options for arable crops will be abolished from 2010. For nuts, protein crops, flax and hemp, the end of partial coupling has been delayed until 2012.

* A maximum of 10% of each country’s single farm payment allocation may be re-allocated under Article 68 schemes that allow for sectoral targeting of aid. The Council increased the proportion of this money that may be coupled to production from 25% to 35%. €90m per year saved by the abolition of energy crop subsidies will be allocated for Article 68 measures in the 12 new member states.

* Single Farm Payments will not be paid below a minimum value of €250, or a minimum one hectare of SFP-eligible farm area. Countries may be entitled to vary this threshold upwards or downwards, according to their own circumstances.

Download the full Presidency press release (in French). Versions in other languages will be available here.

In the second of today’s podcasts from the European Parliament, Paulo Casaca MEP gives his immediate reaction to a series of votes on the CAP health check that saw many MEPs break ranks from agreed party lines, evidence of the passions that are aroused when the Parliament debates food and farming. He argues that the Parliament has lost its way on the CAP and must come up with a new vision for the future of the policy. Mr Casaca is a Portuguese member of the Socialist Group and represents the Azores. He sits on the Budget Committee and chairs the pro-CAP reform Land Use & Food Policy Intergroup.

The European Parliament today votes on the CAP health check. I spoke with Neil Parish MEP (pictured right), who represents the largely rural constituency of South West England and is a farmer himself. He also chairs the Parliament’s agriculture committee, which drafted the report that is being voted on today. Perhaps unusually for a committee chairman, Neil will be voting against his own committee’s report. We discuss the key issues in the health check end-game and the role of the Parliament, the prospects for the CAP reform in the EU budget review and the positive effect of the fall of sterling for UK farmers.

If Europe’s wealthiest landowners, from the Duke of Westminster in the UK to Prince Albert of Monaco to the fabulously-named Johannes Adam Ferdinand Alois Josef Maria Marko d’Aviano Pius von und zu Liechtenstein (aka Hans Adam II, Prince of Liechtenstein) were having sleepless nights over the future of their six and seven figure annual handouts from the Common Agricultural Policy, they can rest assured that they have friends in high places. Or at least, they have friends in the European Parliament. [...]

A major conference entitled “Reforming the Budget, Changing Europe” was held yesterday in Brussels, marking the end of the consultation phase of the ‘no taboos’ review of the future of the EU budget led by Budget Commissioner Dalia Grybauskaité. The former Lithuanian finance minister presented the results of the consultation process that received more than 300 responses including position papers from each of the twenty-seven member states along with NGOs, universities, regional and local governments, think tanks, lobby groups and businesses. It is clear that Grybauskaité is no friend of the Common Agricultural Policy, especially its €30 billion in direct payments. [...]