COVID-19 leaves limited traces in preliminary 2020 agricultural accounts

Eurostat has now published its preliminary estimates for the economic accounts for agriculture in the EU for 2020. This gives us the first authoritative overview of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on agricultural markets and farm incomes in what has been an extraordinary year. Until now, information on monthly trends in agricultural prices and agricultural trade has given us some partial insights into the impact of COVID-19 on the agricultural sector. Despite wobbles in some sectors, by and large these indicators show that the agricultural sector has been remarkably resilient. Despite this, significant aid packages have been made available to farmers by EU Member States. These preliminary estimates of the 2020 agricultural accounts give us a status update over these developments.

The accounts confirm a small fall in the value of EU agricultural output in 2020 and a greater fall in farm income compared to 2019, although not all of this is linked to COVID. Surprisingly, there is no visible impact of the support measures put in place. This contrasts with the U.S. experience where very sizeable aid packages have increased U.S. farm income significantly. This post explores what the latest release can tell us.

Agricultural output in 2020

The following table shows the preliminary value of agricultural output in 2020 compared to previous years. The value of output of the agricultural industry declined by 1.6% compared to 2019 but was still ahead (by 0.3%) of the average of the previous three years. All in all, this suggests that the potential for COVID-19 disruption flagged at the beginning of the lockdowns – border closures and transport restrictions, shortages of seasonal workers, closures of processing plants, and the significant shift in food consumption patterns due to the closure of the food service and hospitality sectors – failed to materialise. This was due at least in part to prompt action by the European Commission at the beginning of the crisis to ensure the continued flow of food products within the single market. It also testifies to the remarkable resilience of farmers and the European food system when faced with a shock of this magnitude.

Source:  Eurostat, Economic accounts for agriculture – values at current prices [aact_eaa01]. EU27 is without the United Kingdom.

These overall figures net out the impact of different influences on agricultural markets. It is possible that a negative COVID-19 impact might be offset by more positive influences from international markets, for example. A closer look at some individual items reveals some of the wobbles.

Potatoes and olive oil stand out as two sectors that were particularly hard hit in 2020. Potatoes were affected by the drop in demand for potatoes for processing because of the fall-off in demand for French fries as fast food and other restaurants closed. This is a direct COVID-19 impact. The sharp fall in the value of olive oil output is more related to the high level of production in 2019 which led to low market prices in the first half of 2020. The U.S. has imposed tariffs on imports of Spanish table olives, but this is not a factor in olive oil prices. Global olive oil consumption was at a record high in 2020 and EU exports increased by 16% in the marketing year Oct 2019 to Sept 2020. Although the harvesting of olives is affected by reduced numbers of foreign seasonal workers, the sharp drop in the value of olive oil output in 2020 does not appear to be COVID-related.

The stability in revenues for other sectors that were thought to be adversely affected in the early period of lockdowns should also be underlined. For example, overall revenue for vegetables and horticulture, particularly exposed to vulnerabilities due to labour shortages and transport bottlenecks, was maintained. This is the case also for the flowers sub-sector despite early indications of losses in the Netherlands. On the other hand, the value of meat and milk output fell somewhat, with a particularly large fall in the value of poultry output which, again, may reflect the closure of food service outlets during lockdowns.

This relatively benign outcome for agricultural output is confirmed by the limited interest in the market support measures introduced by the Commission at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Private storage aid was opened for various dairy products as well as beef and sheepmeat from 7 May 2020 and was closed for dairy products on 30 June 2020 and for beef and sheepmeat on 17 July 2020. This measure allowed the temporary withdrawal of products from the market for a minimum of 2 to 3 months, and a maximum period of 5 to 6 months. It was the only measure that involved a direct cost to the EU budget with an allocation of €80 million. Overall, the use of the private storage aid has been limited. By early November 2020, the cumulative volume of contracts concluded amounted to 18,300 tons for skimmed milk powder, 65,019 tons for butter, 43,669 tons for cheese, 1,959 tons for beef, and 15 tons for sheepmeat.

Farm income in 2020

The next table shows the derivation of family farm income (‘entrepreneurial income’) in 2020. Expenditure on intermediate consumption held stable, so the decrease in agricultural Gross Value Added (GVA) at basic prices at 3.5% was larger than the fall in the value of agricultural output compared to 2019. A further rise in fixed capital consumption meant an even greater fall in net value added at basic prices of 6.9%.

Subtracting compensation of employees and adding other subsidies on production (while subtracting other taxes on production, not shown) gives the operating surplus in agriculture. Subtracting rents and interest paid (noting that rents paid show a small increase, another sign of the resilience of the agricultural sector) gives us entrepreneurial income which experienced a significant 7.9% reduction in 2020 compared to 2019. Note that the absolute reduction in the value of entrepreneurial income (€7.1 billion) is fully accounted for by the drop in the value of agricultural output (€7.5 billion). The larger percentage fall in the former reflects the amplification and leveraging of changes in income compared to changes in the value of output given the stability in intermediate consumption and other expenditures.

Source:  Eurostat, Economic accounts for agriculture – values at current prices [aact_eaa01]. EU27 is without the United Kingdom.

National changes

As is always the case, there is considerable variability in Member State experiences around this EU average, as illustrated in the table below. The value of agricultural output increased in several countries, although the sharp drops in Bulgaria and Romania stand out. Because entrepreneurial income is highly leveraged, its variability is much greater than agricultural output value changes. The extent to which these differences across countries can be explained by differences in the impact of COVID-19 impacts would require detailed research. The Netherlands, for example, where both flowers and potatoes were hit early on, has a more negative outcome than most other EU countries. But it cannot be assumed without more detailed analysis that the large falls in entrepreneurial income in Romania, Germany or the UK were COVID-related or not. In general, the national figures do not support the view that there was a general negative COVID-19 effect for EU agriculture as a whole.

Source:  Eurostat, Economic accounts for agriculture – values at current prices [aact_eaa01].

The contribution of subsidies to EU agricultural income

The direct EU budgetary response to the COVID-19 crisis was extremely limited – the €80 million set aside for aids for private storage mentioned earlier. Otherwise, the measures taken at EU level merely permitted Member States to make use of unspent commitments in their rural development programmes and sectoral programmes. This reflected the very limited budgetary room for manoeuvre in the last year of the Multi-annual Financial Framework and the unwillingness of Member States to activate the crisis reserve.

Instead, the EU introduced a Temporary Framework for State Aid that allowed Member States to provide additional assistance to, among others, their agricultural and food processing sectors. The EU has notified those schemes that had a specific agricultural focus to the WTO Committee on Agriculture. The following table, drawn from these notifications, indicates that Member States planned to allocate over €4.4 billion to their agricultural and food processing sectors. This is certainly an underestimate. Large countries such as France, Germany and Spain are omitted from this table, most likely because the farm assistance provided in these countries was included under an umbrella assistance scheme for all sectors and the share allocated to farmers is indeterminate. Nonetheless, Member States sought permission to provide at least €4.4 billion in support to agriculture in response to the pandemic.

Source:  Own tabulation based on EU WTO notifications in WTO documents G/AG/GEN/159, G/AG/GEN/159/Add.1, G/AG/GEN/159/Add.2 and G/AG/GEN/159/Add.3. Includes measures adopted by EU Member States up to 10 November 2020.

The puzzling fact is that this additional assistance does not show up in the subsidy elements of the 2020 economic accounts for agriculture. Subsidies are included either as product subsidies (coupled to specific commodities) or as other subsidies on production (including direct payments and area-based payments in rural development programmes). According to the accounts, there was a small increase in product subsidies (of around €150 million) but no significant change in other subsidies on production.

There could be several explanations. One is that Member States have made commitments to farmers but this money was not paid out in 2020. Another is that the assistance notified under the Temporary State Aid Framework can be a mixture of grants and loans. The loan elements would not necessarily show up as a subsidy transfer to farmer (interest rate subsidies on subsidised loans are not separately notified in the accounts, but the very small fall in interest paid shown in the table above does not seem to reflect any major impact from this source). I find it overall puzzling why subsidy payments to farmers in 2020 have remained unchanged despite the huge assistance packages, it would be helpful if anyone is able to throw further light on this.

Source:  Eurostat, Economic accounts for agriculture – values at current prices [aact_eaa01]. EU27 is without the United Kingdom.

This is in dramatic contrast to the U.S. where one-off COVID-related payments to farmers have pushed U.S. farm income to a near-term high. The value of agricultural output in the U.S. in 2020 is expected to decline only slightly relative to 2019 by 0.9%. But net farm income is forecast to increase $36.0 billion (43.1%) to $119.6 billion in 2020. This is largely due to an increase in direct Government farm payments to $46.5 billion in 2020, an increase of $24.0 billion in nominal terms (107.1%) because of supplemental and ad hoc disaster assistance for COVID-19 relief.

Source:  USDA, U.S. Farm sector financial indicators

Conclusions

In the very early days of the COVID-19 pandemic there were justified fears that the lockdowns and associated restrictions could have very negative impacts on EU agriculture and the food industry. Thanks to extraordinary effects by farmers, the food system, regulators and the Commission, these dire predictions did not come to pass. The end-of-year accounts just published by Eurostat, while documenting a significant fall in family farm income compared to 2019, also highlight how resilient the farm sector has been.

The big puzzle in these figures is that the significant increase in Member State assistance to their agricultural sectors does not show up in the figures. It would be really good to get a clear explanation why this is not the case.

This post was written by Alan Matthews

Photo credit: bogitw on pixabay, used courtesy of a Creative Commons licence.

Eurostat publishes preliminary 2019 farm output and income data

Eurostat has now published preliminary estimates of 2019 agricultural output and income. The value of agricultural output in current prices shows a small further increase in 2019 as compared to 2018. Compared to the previous peak in 2013, agricultural output value has grown by just under 4% in the past six years. This is mainly due to an increase in the value of crop output, with the increase in the value of livestock output lagging behind. However, because of greater spending on intermediate consumption, gross value added in agriculture remains just below the record 2017 level.

Operating surplus (the return to land, capital and family labour) also increased compared to 2018 but is still well below the record 2017 level. Compared to the previous peak in 2013, operating surplus has increased by 4.4%. Allowing for payments on borrowed capital and rented land, the figure for net entrepreneurial income (family farm income) also shows a small recovery compared to 2018 and has increased by 5.5% compared to the previous peak in 2013.

Source:  Eurostat, Economic Accounts for Agriculture [aact_eaa01], values in current prices

Averaging over the EU28 conceals very different changes at the country level (and even more so at regional and enterprise level). The country changes for three variables, gross value added (GVA), operating surplus and net entrepreneurial income are shown in the following chart. In general, volatility increases as one moves from GVA to operating surplus to net entrepreneurial income as the degree of leverage increases.

For example, GVA in Denmark increased by 58%, operating surplus by 188% and entrepreneurial income by a whopping 760% (from €168 million in 2018 to €1,446 million in 2019, the best outcome ever obtained by Danish farmers, and no doubt particularly welcome as it follows some years with negative income).

Similarly, GVA in Estonia increased by 51%, operating surplus by 86% and entrepreneurial income by 202% in 2019 compared to 2018.

Germany also shows a strong recovery, with GVA increasing by 28%, operating surplus by 59% and entrepreneurial income by 137%, though the latter still lies well below the levels observed at the start of the decade.

The main reason for the sizeable differences in the volatility of family farm income across countries is that in some countries the family farm income share of total output is quite small. This means that even small changes in the value of output or inputs translate into much larger ‘shocks’ to family farm income – this is what I meant when I describe the latter as highly leveraged.

In the EU28 in 2018, family farm income (FFI) amounted to €105 billion compared to the value of output of €434 billion or a share just under 25%. For the countries with the most extreme per cent changes in family farm income, the percentage share was much lower.

In Denmark, for example, FFI in 2018 was just €168 million compared to gross output value of €10, 316 million. In 2019, the latter increased by €1,333 million to reach a total of €11,640 million, an increase of 13%. However, this resulted in an increase in FFI of €1,277 million, from €168 million to €1,446 million, or an increase of 760%! The absolute values the changes were very similar but they translate into very different percentage changes because the base levels are so different. A similar explanation applies in the case of Estonia and Germany although not to such an extreme extent.

At the other end of the table are those countries that experienced a fall in entrepreneurial income in 2019, including Romania, Italy, Bulgaria, Spain, France and Slovakia.

Farmers across the EU may operate in a single market, but output and income trends remain highly divergent due to differences in enterprise specialisation, production systems, weather conditions and market trends.

Source:  Eurostat, Economic Accounts for Agriculture [aact_eaa01], values in current prices

This post was written by Alan Matthews

17 December 2019: The post was updated to add the paragraphs explaining the notion of leverage and how it explains the large percentage changes in family farm income.

Picture credit: PaisJoana public domain image

Trends in EU agricultural self-sufficiency

Worries and concerns about food security, real or imagined, have figured prominently in the debate on EU agricultural policy since the Commission launched its consultation document on the recent CAP reform in 2010, stimulated by the price spike on global food markets in the years 2007-08. This week, at the informal Farm Council in Milan on Tuesday 30 September under the Italian Presidency, agricultural ministers will discuss how EU agriculture can contribute to the food security challenge.

One of the issues that constantly pops up in this debate is the importance of food self-sufficiency as a guarantor of food security. Food self-sufficiency is defined as the proportion of domestic consumption met from domestic production. In my view, identifying food security with food self-sufficiency is misleading and, indeed, potentially dangerous if it diverts attention away from more real threats to food security, but that argument is for another day. Nonetheless, to debate this issue requires, at least, good information on the underlying figures and trends. Despite the public interest in these figures, it is actually rather difficult to get reliable information.

Eurostat has thrown its hands up….

Eurostat used to produce self-sufficiency ratios for agricultural commodities in its domain ‘food_in_pagr6’ but this dataset has been discontinued since 13 March 2013. In any case, it was of limited help because it only gave incomplete information on individual countries and did not calculate a self-sufficiency ratio for the EU as a whole (data for the latest available year in this series can be found not on the Eurostat website but in the DG AGRI publication EU agriculture – Statistical and economic information – 2013).

Eurostat also seems to have given up on publishing commodity balance sheets, even though these are regularly calculated by national statistical offices in the EU. Its latest information on crop supply balances (which in any case only covered cereals, sugar and wine but not, for example, vegetable oils or oilseeds) mentions that all other supply balance sheets have been discontinued, and that the year 2013 is the last year for the supply balance sheets on cereals and sugar. Only the wine supply balance sheets will continue in the future. I could find no reason for this decision on its website.

Noleppa and Cartsberg, in their 2013 working paper Agricultural Self-sufficiency of the European Union: Statistical Evidence comment that “The information base on the EU’s agricultural self-sufficiency is very weak”. In their attempt to build agricultural self-sufficiency indicators for the EU, they turn to FAOSTAT commodity balance sheets where the information can be readily derived. But it is unsatisfactory to have to rely on FAO figures to throw light on self-sufficiency trends in the EU.

In fact, the only rather opaque official EU source that I know from which agricultural self-sufficiency ratios can be derived is the statistical annex in the annual medium-term market outlook publication produced by DG AGRI. This source also includes vegetable oils and oilseeds, but its tables are forward-looking (covering projections for the coming decade) and only include a couple of years’ historical data in each issue. DG AGRI helpfully provides Excel versions of these tables on its market outlook website (but a suggestion to the good people in DG AGRI, why not include the full series of historic data in these Excel tables in future editions?).

… or has it?

I was surprised, therefore, when attached to the background document prepared by the Italian Presidency for the informal Farm Council I found a statistical table showing commodity self-sufficiency ratios for the EU as a whole for the period 2004-2013….. prepared by Eurostat! How the Italian Presidency managed to drag these figures out of the bowels of the Eurostat building in Luxembourg remains a mystery, but I reproduce the table here. The ratios generally agree with those in the latest DG AGRI medium-term market outlook, though with some differences for the estimated 2013 outcome.

The table covers the period from 2004, i.e. just before the introduction of decoupling, to 2013 (where the figures are estimated). The revealed trends in self-sufficiency are interesting. Fitting exponential trends to the data, there are five commodities – cheese, skimmed milk powder, beef and veal, pigmeat and sheep and goat meat – where there has been a statistically significant increase in EU self-sufficiency. There has been no significant change in self-sufficiency ratios over the period for the four cereals (wheat, barley, maize and rice), nor for whole milk powder and poultrymeat.

For only two of the commodities in the table has self-sufficiency declined, sugar and butter. In the case of sugar, where the ratio only relates to sugar use in food production (the use of sugar for ethanol production is excluded) this was a deliberate consequence of the reform of the EU sugar regime. In the case of butter, the decline in the self-sufficiency ratio is small, albeit statistically significant, and the EU remains a net exporter.

Self-sufficiency depends both on consumption and production, and the ratio can increase even if production is falling if consumption is falling even faster. Nonetheless, it is striking that the EU has increased its self-sufficiency in meats, given the oft-heard suggestion that the industry’s competitiveness has been undermined by higher animal welfare and environmental standards.

The introduction of decoupling in 2005 was expected to lead to a reduction in EU self-sufficiency but it seems that, for most commodities, this has been balanced by the removal or reduction in supply controls (set-aside for arable crops, increases in milk quotas) and the prevailing high market prices over the period.

Projected future trends in EU food self-sufficiency

To complete the story, I attach a second table which shows the expected trends in self-sufficiency rates derived from the 2013 edition of the DG AGRI medium-term market outlook. This source also gives data for vegetable oils and oilseeds which throws light on the ‘protein gap’ debate within the EU. I have truncated the table at 2020 although the source gives figures to 2023.

Overall, very little change in the EU’s self-sufficiency ratios is expected to 2020 based on these projections. Small increases in self-sufficiency will be seen in cheese, skimmed milk powder, pigmeat, poultrymeat and oilseeds, and small decreases in barley, rice, whole milk powder and beef and veal. No significant trend is observed for the remaining commodities.

When the agricultural Ministers meet on Tuesday to discuss how EU agriculture can contribute to the food security challenge, I hope they will not dwell too much on food self-sufficiency as a factor in this debate. The figures should be monitored, but the trends tell us little about whether the EU is becoming more or less food-secure. The EU is both an exporter and importer of food commodities, depending on its comparative advantage, and this is as it should be.

But wouldn’t it be great if Eurostat could get its act together and regularly disseminate the relevant figures not just for the EU as a whole for also for the individual member states?

Picture credit: Pixabay

This post was written by Alan Matthews.