Franco-German position on future of the CAP

This week the governments of France and Germany have published a short document setting out their common position on the future of the common agricultural policy. It makes for fairly light reading though the following points are worth remarking on:

– The common position endorses further moves towards greater market orientation in the CAP but suggests countervailing measures are needed “to buffer devastating effects of growing price volatility and market crises”.

– There is nothing concrete on the future budget of the CAP and it is stressed that “a final decision on all questions relating to finances will be made when decisions are made on all policies and the entire EU financial framework”. In other words, there is not going to be another stitch-up like the Chirac-Schroeder deal of 2002 which effectively fixed the CAP budget for the next 11 years, short-circuiting the normal EU budget-setting processes.

– The two pillar structure of the CAP should be maintained, and no national co-financing should be required of pillar one expenditure (i.e. direct payments and market measures). This is something of a surprise, coming as it does from Germany, the major net contributor to the CAP and France, that is soon to become a net contributor. Co-financing is one way for net contributor countries to improve their budget balances.

– Once the budgets of the two pillars have been decided, there should be no need for modulation of funds between the pillars.

– While new measures may be needed to meet new challenges and objectives, these must “take very carefully into account the financial implications for each Member State.”

– It is argued that “EU standards must be met by all imported products” though it is not clear whether this relates to methods of production or EU sanitary and phytosanitary standards, which imports must meet already.

– The common position states that “In some sectors we need more transparency and more market power for the producer” and suggests some methods by which this could be achieved.

– “Decoupled payments have to remain central in any future system.” The common position argues that “direct payments provide remuneration for public goods that are not rewarded by the market, cover production cost caused by higher production standards desired by society and they contribute to the income of farmers and are an essential part of the risk reducing safety net for European agriculture”. France and Germany reject “EU-wide flat rate” for direct payments and argue that direct payment rates are to be set with regard to net budget positions of member states. Effectively, this is France and Germany saying they don’t want to pay any more for direct payments to Polish and Romanian farmers.

– Member states should investigate, on a voluntary basis, insurance and mutual funds, as a method for stabilising farm incomes over time.

– The countries support greater national flexibility in rural development policies and in “distribution of direct payments within a Member State”.

What should we make of the common position? It reads rather as though France’s main priority is to secure its own position on the CAP, which is to preserve the status quo with the addition of measures of the kind that were introduced as emergency measures during last year’s milk price crash. Germany, which also has concerns about price volatility, is additionally looking to constrain the CAP budget (and the EU budget more widely) and protect its national budgetary position.

The 5-page document can be downloaded from here (PDF).

Public goods in the spotlight

What’s in a word? Or, to be more specific, two words? Where CAP and the term ‘public good’ is concerned, quite a lot. A new briefing note from the Institute for European Environment Policy takes a look at how the slogan ‘public money for public goods’ has come to define the political debate over the future shape of the CAP.

The briefing looks at the evolution of the idea of environmental public goods as a justification for future public expenditure on agriculture. It also sounds a note of caution, that’s worth repeating here:

The increasing visibility of the public goods concept however, has resulted in the concept being interpreted in different ways. It appears that there has been recognition of this agenda as one with real gravity and legitimacy, and therefore for political reasons some interests are trying to justify various aspects of current policy as conducive to, or essential for outcomes that they have presented as ‘public goods’. There are for example several cases that can be found where the term is being used more generally to refer to any sort of ‘public benefit’ from agriculture. For example, COPA COGECA have started to use the term to refer to ‘maintaining farming activities’ and ‘keeping farm income stable’ as a means of justifying public support. It is also becoming increasingly commonplace for policy interventions via the CAP to be sought as a means of providing public goods, even if this is not the most appropriate policy instrument. The debate over Europe’s role in contributing to global food security is a case in point.

Some clarification of the rhetoric of public goods in the agricultural context is needed. Without it there is the danger that the term will be misused as a justification for supporting anything in the ‘public interest’. CAP commentators such as Alan Matthews of Trinity College Dublin have noted this confusion, stating that current understanding of the term appears overly “elastic”.

Quite right. You can read the briefing in full at the CAP2020 website.

Budget rumbles in Brussels

The summer break has come and gone and with the European Parliament back in session, Commissioners back from their yachts and their fonctionnaires back at their desks, the future of the EU budget is back in the spotlight.

As part of the December 2005 heads of government agreement on the 2007-2013 financial perspective it was agreed that there would be a midterm ‘budget review’ in 2008-09 which would look at all areas of the EU budget. including the two hottest political potatoes – the large share of funds going to the CAP and the British budget rebate. The review began with a big public consultation led by the then Budget Commissioner Dalia Grybauskaite, who pulled no punches in describing the budget as largely out of tune with Europe’s current and future challenges. However, she left the Commission early to become President of Lithuania and with delays to the Lisbon Treaty ratification the review process slowed to a standstill.

The future of the budget hit the headlines late last year with the leaking of an early draft of the Commission’s communication on the future of the budget. This suggested share going to the CAP and Europe’s regional policy needed scaling back to free resources for innovation, energy security, climate change and jobs. The document, which is understood to have been drafted by Commission President Barroso’s close advisers, was immediately disowned by a handful of outgoing Commissioners who saw it as a threat to their own budget lines.

We now learn that the Commission’s revised communication will be published in the first week of October (expect leaks before that). Budget Commissioner Janusz Lewandowski is said to favour “evolution over revolution” and in an interview with the German newspaper Handelsblatt the Commissioner suggested a reduction in the CAP budget. This week his officials have suggested the CAP budget could decline to around 33 per cent of the total (down from the current 40 per cent). MEPs with close links to farming lobbies are already raising the alarm. Irish MEP Mairead McGuinness said

“The Budget Commissioner sees a future with less spent on agriculture and more on research and innovation. His words are part of a softening up process, preparing the ground for a lower agriculture budget”

Yet Lewandowski is clearly taking a more cautious approach than previous Commissions. A decade ago the Prodi Commission suggested the CAP budget be cut to 30 per cent of the total EU budget. Prodi was eventually outmaneuvered by his own Agriculture Commissioner Franz Fischler and the CAP budget has increased each year since then with the bulk of it being ring-fenced up to 2013 under the terms of a deal made by French and German heads of government back in 2002.

Meanwhile, current Commission President Barroso, in his first ‘State of the Union’ address, steered clear of saying anything concrete on the future of the CAP that might frighten the horses. He called for “an open debate without taboos”, argued that the EU budget should be directed “where it leverages growth & delivers on our European agenda” and said that farm policy should contribute towards achieving global food security and the sustainable management of natural resources and reversing biodiversity loss.

One issue that looms large over the CAP is the possible extension of national co-financing, which applies to every other part of the EU budget, to CAP farm subsidies. This would help countries that are net contributors to the budget and might free up resources within the EU budget for other areas. It’s a move that seems to have been accepted by influential parliamentarians like Paolo De Castro MEP, chairman of the Agriculture Committee and is thought to be favoured by the French government.

In a possible sign of things to come in relation to co-financing, the Czech Republic government has decided that it will no longer make voluntary nationally-financed contributions to top-up CAP direct payments to Czech farmers and landowners. These optional payments have been taken up by all of the new member states during a transition period in which the EU funded contribution covers only a share of the total payments that can be made. The amounts involved have been substantial. In 2010, for example, the Czech government had topped up EU farm subsidy payments by €271 million. In the same year Poland topped up its farm subsidy payments by €1.1 billion, Hungary by €529 million and Bulgaria by €267 million.

There can be no doubt that if the CAP sees more national co-responsibility the idea of farm subsidies as ‘free money from Brussels’ will fade. Co-financing will focus minds in national finance ministries on whether voters would scarce national public funds should be spent on farm subsidies while cuts are being made in other areas like health, education, defence and housing.

Why are we so lousy at measuring farmers' incomes?

It has been heard and written everywhere for the last 18 months: farm incomes have gone down dramatically. After two years of carpet bombing by the media, with anything from 60 percent price fall in prices to desperate farmers spreading their milk in the fields, the consultation on the future of the CAP organized by Commissioner Ciolos suggest that many, in the civil society, are convinced that EU farmers are starving. As an external reviewer of the synthesis report of this consultation, I saw a large sample of individual contributions. My feeling is that for many people, the current low farm incomes justify subsidies, border protection and paying more attention to mechanisms to support farm prices. In France, the tone of the debates on the national agricultural law is such that for all journalists, and even more Members of Parliament, the current perception is that agriculture is a synonym for “lumpen proletariat”.
The fall in farm income experienced in 2009 was genuine. It resulted from falling output prices, while input prices had remained high. There is no question that the economic situation of many farms has been disastrous. All figures, whatever their sources, do show low incomes even when compared to period before the price peak 2007-2008. However, sugar prices have been high for quite a long time. Oilseed prices have remained steady. Butter prices recovered very rapidly in 2009. After two years of low prices, cereals prices recently reached levels that ensure a high return to most growers, and future markets suggest they will keep rising. Fertilizer prices went down. Still, most of the newspapers, politicians and the public opinion talk about farmers as the category being hit most by the economic crisis.
One explanation is that farmers’ organisations have been efficient at surfing on the agricultural crisis, stressing the low incomes and the need for assistance. It’s hard to blame them for “not missing the opportunity of a good crisis”. By playing the communication card on incomes – in particular to the ears of the European Parliament – they may even end up avoiding large budget cuts, if not complete dismantling of the CAP after 2013, something that was on the radar only 2 years ago. However, given the importance of the issue of farm income in the debates on the future CAP, we should be able to rely on good data. And on this issue, it is surprising to see that data on farm incomes are so poor and questionable.
One example of the crude statistics that have been put forward in the ongoing debate on the CAP is the way the Commission disseminates figures on agricultural income. I am seldom critical of DG Agri, which has an expertise that I find impressive and a political orientation (at least under the last three commissioners) that I find rather “fair and balanced”. However, I have a hard time with the graph below, which comes from a standard DG-Agri presentation (this one was given by Pierre Bascou in Paris but I suspect this is a graph that is part of all DG Agri representatives’ toolkit).

The point by DG Agri here, seems to illustrate that farmers’ incomes are low compared to the rest of the population. Hence the need for keeping agricultural policy instruments. While I can be sympathetic with the idea, I just can’t buy the figures. Indeed Spain is the only EU Member where farmers make more money than the average worker. In the EU-27, agricultural income is roughly 43% of the average income. In Denmark it is 10%. In France, it is 70%, and it is even less in the UK. And these figures are even before the large fall in income in 2009.
First, in all cases, the figures contradict fundamentally the findings of the last extensive study coordinated by Berkeley Hill at the beginning of the 2000s, by the OECD later, that compared the income of agricultural households and the average household, even if one updates this benchmark by national indexes of changes in real income over time. It contradicts the scarce national data on “professional farms” that shows that for these farmers, farm incomes are often comparable to other incomes over the period considered. Second, if farm income is only 10% of the national average, resources should be moving away from farming at a rate that far exceeds the one observed in Denmark: these figures just do not make sense from a macroeconomic point of view.
Clearly, there are several approaches to measure farm incomes. Much depend on:
– how you define a farmer (is 1 hectare or 10 beehives really enough to qualify?);
– how you measure farm labour (something done in a terrible way in the EU by the way with very crude measures such as the Annual Labour Unit, while in the United States statisticians can control for the actual number of hours working off-farm, qualification, age, gender, etc.);
– how you defined income (result of agricultural activity? Including subsidies? Including social transfers? Including rents of land leased out? Agritourism? Work carried out for other farmers? Off-farm income?);
– and which sources you start from, e.g. farm business association data or macroeconomic accounts.
I had been planning to take a deeper look at how DG Agri figures were calculated before posting anything. However, before having time to do so, I came across the recent text by Berkeley Hill, which I find very interesting. His comments are more general, but I find them particularly relevant to the DG Agri figures. He points out that the current approaches to measure farm incomes are not satisfactory, and he wonders why the different projects of measuring the income of the agricultural household have not been pursued further. I fully agree with Hill on his different points. I could also add critiques to the current approaches that he does not mention, for example:
– The EU does not do a good job with the measurement of farm income using macroeconomic accounts for methodological reasons. For example, you can pretty much get the net value added or the sectoral income you want by adopting a convention on the decay of the equipments and buildings (maximum service life, shape of the decay curve over time, e.g. geometric, linear, hyperbolic or “one hoss shay”, and if you are very smart, assumptions on the statistical distribution of the age of the buildings). All of these will affect your figure for depreciation and hence the net value added and income. There are also many possible assumptions on how you remunerate land in property by farmers, and massive assets such as plantations. For example, last time I looked at this (years ago, they may since have changed it) some member states used for the same building a depreciation period that ranged between 12 to 50 years, generating considerable differences in economic depreciation and hence in agricultural income just because of unsubstantiated assumptions. Perhaps not a big issue in time series comparisons, but so much for consistency and comparability across member states.
– Regarding microeconomic sources, the RICA (Farm Accounting Data Network sometimes called FADN) is representative of the all farm sector in some member states but much less in others. Part time farmers are not included. Large farmers refuse to cooperate and are simply not represented in some member states where collection of data is on a voluntary basis. And off-farm income is not included while it is now a major source of income in many EU agricultural households. The measurement of labour is particularly crude, with simplistic assumptions on the work of the spouse and other family labour. This is not a criticism: I am happy that this source exists since we have nothing else, and I often use it. But it hardly allows comparison of farmers’ incomes with the rest of the population.
The issue is complex and there is no simple solution from a methodological point of view. Other countries such as the United States face similar problems in defining what a farm is and what farm income amounts to. For example, USDA figures show that 87 percent of what the USDA defines as farms have less than $10 000 annually in agricultural revenue. No doubt that in the EU, such a figure would be used to show how poor farmers are. But US statisticians have managed to measure the actual income in a much more satisfactory way. And USDA figures indicate that the average household income of these farms that have less than $10 000 in agricultural sales is actually $71 000, once off-farm income and social transfers are taken into account. Something we seem unable to do in the EU, opening the door for journalists to publish dramatically low figures without the necessary precautions.
If the CAP moves towards a farm income support policy, which it did with the progressive decoupling of payments, and if farmers’ organisations stress the need for support on the basis of low incomes, one should be able to collect reliable information on farm incomes. And to see how these incomes compare to those of urban poor or other categories that are also hit by the economic crisis.
Photograph: Migrant Mother (1936) by Dorothea Lang. Lang’s photograph of a destitute 32-year old migrant farm worker and her children is among the most famous images of rural America during the Great Depression.

Why are we so lousy at measuring farmers’ incomes?

It has been heard and written everywhere for the last 18 months: farm incomes have gone down dramatically. After two years of carpet bombing by the media, with anything from 60 percent price fall in prices to desperate farmers spreading their milk in the fields, the consultation on the future of the CAP organized by Commissioner Ciolos suggest that many, in the civil society, are convinced that EU farmers are starving. As an external reviewer of the synthesis report of this consultation, I saw a large sample of individual contributions. My feeling is that for many people, the current low farm incomes justify subsidies, border protection and paying more attention to mechanisms to support farm prices. In France, the tone of the debates on the national agricultural law is such that for all journalists, and even more Members of Parliament, the current perception is that agriculture is a synonym for “lumpen proletariat”.

The fall in farm income experienced in 2009 was genuine. It resulted from falling output prices, while input prices had remained high. There is no question that the economic situation of many farms has been disastrous. All figures, whatever their sources, do show low incomes even when compared to period before the price peak 2007-2008. However, sugar prices have been high for quite a long time. Oilseed prices have remained steady. Butter prices recovered very rapidly in 2009. After two years of low prices, cereals prices recently reached levels that ensure a high return to most growers, and future markets suggest they will keep rising. Fertilizer prices went down. Still, most of the newspapers, politicians and the public opinion talk about farmers as the category being hit most by the economic crisis.

One explanation is that farmers’ organisations have been efficient at surfing on the agricultural crisis, stressing the low incomes and the need for assistance. It’s hard to blame them for “not missing the opportunity of a good crisis”. By playing the communication card on incomes – in particular to the ears of the European Parliament – they may even end up avoiding large budget cuts, if not complete dismantling of the CAP after 2013, something that was on the radar only 2 years ago. However, given the importance of the issue of farm income in the debates on the future CAP, we should be able to rely on good data. And on this issue, it is surprising to see that data on farm incomes are so poor and questionable.

One example of the crude statistics that have been put forward in the ongoing debate on the CAP is the way the Commission disseminates figures on agricultural income. I am seldom critical of DG Agri, which has an expertise that I find impressive and a political orientation (at least under the last three commissioners) that I find rather “fair and balanced”. However, I have a hard time with the graph below, which comes from a standard DG-Agri presentation (this one was given by Pierre Bascou in Paris but I suspect this is a graph that is part of all DG Agri representatives’ toolkit).

The point by DG Agri here, seems to illustrate that farmers’ incomes are low compared to the rest of the population. Hence the need for keeping agricultural policy instruments. While I can be sympathetic with the idea, I just can’t buy the figures. Indeed Spain is the only EU Member where farmers make more money than the average worker. In the EU-27, agricultural income is roughly 43% of the average income. In Denmark it is 10%. In France, it is 70%, and it is even less in the UK. And these figures are even before the large fall in income in 2009.

First, in all cases, the figures contradict fundamentally the findings of the last extensive study coordinated by Berkeley Hill at the beginning of the 2000s, by the OECD later, that compared the income of agricultural households and the average household, even if one updates this benchmark by national indexes of changes in real income over time. It contradicts the scarce national data on “professional farms” that shows that for these farmers, farm incomes are often comparable to other incomes over the period considered. Second, if farm income is only 10% of the national average, resources should be moving away from farming at a rate that far exceeds the one observed in Denmark: these figures just do not make sense from a macroeconomic point of view.

Clearly, there are several approaches to measure farm incomes. Much depend on:

– how you define a farmer (is 1 hectare or 10 beehives really enough to qualify?);

– how you measure farm labour (something done in a terrible way in the EU by the way with very crude measures such as the Annual Labour Unit, while in the United States statisticians can control for the actual number of hours working off-farm, qualification, age, gender, etc.);

– how you defined income (result of agricultural activity? Including subsidies? Including social transfers? Including rents of land leased out? Agritourism? Work carried out for other farmers? Off-farm income?);

– and which sources you start from, e.g. farm business association data or macroeconomic accounts.

I had been planning to take a deeper look at how DG Agri figures were calculated before posting anything. However, before having time to do so, I came across the recent text by Berkeley Hill, which I find very interesting. His comments are more general, but I find them particularly relevant to the DG Agri figures. He points out that the current approaches to measure farm incomes are not satisfactory, and he wonders why the different projects of measuring the income of the agricultural household have not been pursued further. I fully agree with Hill on his different points. I could also add critiques to the current approaches that he does not mention, for example:

– The EU does not do a good job with the measurement of farm income using macroeconomic accounts for methodological reasons. For example, you can pretty much get the net value added or the sectoral income you want by adopting a convention on the decay of the equipments and buildings (maximum service life, shape of the decay curve over time, e.g. geometric, linear, hyperbolic or “one hoss shay”, and if you are very smart, assumptions on the statistical distribution of the age of the buildings). All of these will affect your figure for depreciation and hence the net value added and income. There are also many possible assumptions on how you remunerate land in property by farmers, and massive assets such as plantations. For example, last time I looked at this (years ago, they may since have changed it) some member states used for the same building a depreciation period that ranged between 12 to 50 years, generating considerable differences in economic depreciation and hence in agricultural income just because of unsubstantiated assumptions. Perhaps not a big issue in time series comparisons, but so much for consistency and comparability across member states.

– Regarding microeconomic sources, the RICA (Farm Accounting Data Network sometimes called FADN) is representative of the all farm sector in some member states but much less in others. Part time farmers are not included. Large farmers refuse to cooperate and are simply not represented in some member states where collection of data is on a voluntary basis. And off-farm income is not included while it is now a major source of income in many EU agricultural households. The measurement of labour is particularly crude, with simplistic assumptions on the work of the spouse and other family labour. This is not a criticism: I am happy that this source exists since we have nothing else, and I often use it. But it hardly allows comparison of farmers’ incomes with the rest of the population.

The issue is complex and there is no simple solution from a methodological point of view. Other countries such as the United States face similar problems in defining what a farm is and what farm income amounts to. For example, USDA figures show that 87 percent of what the USDA defines as farms have less than $10 000 annually in agricultural revenue. No doubt that in the EU, such a figure would be used to show how poor farmers are. But US statisticians have managed to measure the actual income in a much more satisfactory way. And USDA figures indicate that the average household income of these farms that have less than $10 000 in agricultural sales is actually $71 000, once off-farm income and social transfers are taken into account. Something we seem unable to do in the EU, opening the door for journalists to publish dramatically low figures without the necessary precautions.

If the CAP moves towards a farm income support policy, which it did with the progressive decoupling of payments, and if farmers’ organisations stress the need for support on the basis of low incomes, one should be able to collect reliable information on farm incomes. And to see how these incomes compare to those of urban poor or other categories that are also hit by the economic crisis.

Photograph: Migrant Mother (1936) by Dorothea Lang. Lang’s photograph of a destitute 32-year old migrant farm worker and her children is among the most famous images of rural America during the Great Depression.

Production effects of agri-environmental programmes

EU agri-environmental policy dates back to the mid-1980s and became a mandatory part of the EU agricultural policy toolkit in 1992. Initial implementation in many Member States emphasised policies designed to mitigate the environmental harm associated with agricultural intensification (e.g. by paying farmers to lower fertiliser inputs) but over time and under Commission prodding the objectives have shifted more to environmental enhancement.

Around two-thirds of EU agri-environmental programme payments are classified in the OECD’s Producer Support Measure (PSE) calculations as ‘payments based on input constraints’. Such programmes would be expected to reduce EU production. Empirical attempts to measure the impact of the CAP on EU production and world market prices generally ignore their production-restraining impact and thus tend to over-estimate the world market effects of EU agricultural policy. Continue reading “Production effects of agri-environmental programmes”

Inside the echo-chamber

Today and tomorrow, DG Agriculture is organising a tightly controlled, invitation-only ‘public conference’ on the future of the CAP. As someone who has previously expressed mildly dissenting opinions I’ve not been invited. It’s probably a small mercy as life is really too short to spend two days listening to an assorted crowd of farm union officials, docile civil servants and tame academics parrot the DG Agriculture mantra: ‘we need to preserve the current CAP and its budget to… protect the environment / avert mass starvation / keep farmers from committing suicide (delete as appropriate)’.

There are a few people on the speakers list who might be expected to take issue with DG Agriculture’s infamous doublethink but in a crafty move they have mostly been appointed as session chairs or rapporteurs. I’m thinking here of David Baldock, Jo Swinnen, Alan Matthews and Carlo Petrini. This quartet certainly have some good ideas on where the CAP has gone wrong and how to put it right. It’s a shame they won’t have the opportunity to present them. BirdLife’s redoubtable Ariel Brunner is there, of course, but even his powerful critique will be difficult to be heard above the massed ranks of true believers DG Agriculture has assembled.

Anyway, if you are at the conference, I’d love to hear how it’s going. Honestly.

Carbon efficiency and trade policy

In an earlier post, I wondered whether there were data on the relative carbon efficiency of agricultural production in Europe versus third countries. A recent FAO study arising from a collaborative effort by FAO and the International Dairy Federation which assesses GHG emissions from the dairy food chain throws light on this. The study uses a Life Cycle Analysis (LCA) approach, and thus includes the land use change induced by the consumption of feed (principally soybeans) in intensive dairy systems.

The results are unambiguous:

“A global trend emerging from the results is the lower level of emissions per unit of product in intensive compared to extensive systems. This is mainly driven by two factors: the higher digestibility of the animals’ feed, and the higher milk productivity level… However, it is possible that production systems in industrialised countries will experience increasing emissions with intensification, as the marginal reductions in emissions from enteric fermentation may not compensate for the increased emissions from manure, fossil energy and other inputs.” (p. 52).

The results are summarised in this graphic taken from the report. Total LCA emissions are broken down between production, deforestation and processing, although in all regions production is the largest single component. Western Europe, which is the largest producer of milk, is ranked only in third place as a producer of emissions.

Estimated GHG emissions per kg of standardised milk averaged over regions and the world

There are two implications from these results. The first, given the challenge of almost doubling global food production by 2050 from a 2000 base (70% increase over 2006), is the importance of efficiency improvements in helping to offset the additional GHG emissions we would otherwise expect from higher food production. Agricultural production is highly carbon intensive. The IPCC has reported that agriculture is responsible for over a quarter of anthropogenic GHG emissions, but accounts for only about 4 per cent of global GDP. Agricultural intensification, including but not only through the use of transgenic varieties, has a vital role in limiting the carbon footprint of more food production. A recent ICTSD paper by Tybbert and Sumner discusses the range of agricultural technologies open to developing countries to mitigate and adapt to climate change.

The second consequence has relevance to the debate on carbon leakage where EU agriculture is faced with a carbon price (either a tax or cap and trade system or regulations to limit emissions). Farm groups object to this in part because, in the absence of any measures to tackle consumption, such measures could lead to the displacement of EU production to third countries which are less carbon efficient (the issue of carbon leakage). As limiting the total amount of carbon emitted to the atmosphere is the main objective, such a consequence would clearly be nonsensical. At the same time, the option of excluding EU agriculture from efforts to meet the EU’s global carbon reduction commitments is not a satisfactory option either. One way to resolve this conundrum is to impose border tax adjustments on imports from third countries deemed not to be making an adequate effort to limit emissions, but the use of trade measures as part of carbon policy remains highly controversial.

BirdLife takes aim at Lyon

On the letters pages of this week’s European Voice, Ariel Brunner, head of EU policy at Birdlife International, has launched a stinging attack on the European Parliament’s agriculture committee. It’s worth republishing in full.

Dear Sir,

The result of this week’s vote on George Lyon’s report, ‘The Future of the CAP after 2013’, is clear evidence that the European Parliament’s Agriculture Committee is more interested in protecting the privilege of vested interests than creating a policy fit for the 21st century.

The report robustly defends the direct payment system, yet provides no evidence for its claims that direct payments help ensure European food security, meaningfully stabilise farming incomes or secure environmental benefits. All of these claims can, and must be challenged. Direct payments have virtually no link to food production and European Commission studies have shown that if they were withdrawn, food production in the EU would not be affected. Arguing that direct payments underpin food production, and food security in the EU, is therefore just wrong. Secondly, most direct payments go to a small minority of EU farmers who neither require help nor deliver most for society through environmentally valuable farming systems. The claim that direct payments support environmental service delivery is also misplaced. There is no relationship between the level of payments and the quality of farming practices. The cross compliance system, which at least attaches certain rules to the receipt of subsidies, is riddled with loopholes and poorly enforced. Reading the Parliament’s report, one gets the impression that defending the current highly skewed and unjustifiable distribution of payments is the only priority, with no regard to what these payments are actually for.

There is a clear role for the CAP to encourage and support farmers to adopt more sustainable methods of production and yet the report abjectly fails to call for this. Indeed, the Committee actually voted against an amendment which highlighted measures the CAP should support, from enriching our soils and using water efficiently to protecting carbon stores and areas of wildlife habitat. By rejecting this amendment, the Committee has sent a stark message that it does not care about the environment or the natural resource base upon which food production, and our long-term food security, depends.

The Agricultural Committee’s choice of sticking its head in the sand and protecting the status quo risks robbing the CAP of its legitimacy and sending the parliament into a dead end during the upcoming negotiations on the new EU budget. If the leaders of the European political groups are serious about giving the European Parliament a meaningful role in shaping Europe’s future, they must wake up, take the CAP debate out of the exclusive domain of the traditional farm lobby and make it finally relevant to all of society.

Ariel Brunner
Head of EU Policy
BirdLife International

Photo: © European Parliament – Audiovisual Unit

The worst case scenario examined

A new study from the University of Wageningen in the Netherlands has attempted to model the effects of the abolition of EU farm subsidies. The authors of the report state that their study is very much a ‘worst case assessment’ since,

“It does not take into account farmers’ behaviour, although the past has shown that farmers do adapt to changes in the Common Agricultural Policy. It also assumes a fixed cost structure and abstracts from changes in factor prices and structural change, all elements which would reduce the impact of reform on farm incomes.”

The report makes it clear that the effect of subsidies – and their removal – is not felt evenly across Europe. In countries such as the Netherlands, Italy and Belgium the share of farm subsidies in total agricultural output is below or around 10%, in Austria and Slovenia above 30%, in Ireland around 50% and in Finland even above 60%.

The level of subsidies in the grazing livestock sector is the highest, followed by the arable sector. The horticultural sector, and to a lesser extend the wine and intensive livestock sector receive the lowest amount of subsidies related to total output. As the report puts it, “the ‘non-CAP types of farms’ (e.g. horticulture, permanent crops and intensive livestock) have, in general, better prospects than the ‘CAP types of farms’.” Unfortunately, the ‘CAP types of farm’ account for some 95 per cent of EU land devoted to agriculture and so “the deterioration of the viability of these farms as a result of the abolition of the subsidies may have a serious impact on the structure of the farm sector as well as on the vitality of rural areas.”

The report concludes:

“The viability of farms in Spain, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Belgium and Austria is hardly affected [by the removal of subsidies], whilst farms in Denmark, Ireland, Sweden and the UK, as well as farms of some types in France, Germany, Hungary and Slovakia are heavily affected. In these countries, abolition of decoupled payments results in a large share of farms with negative farm incomes.”

The analysis looks only at first-order impacts and makes no attempt to predict how farmer behaviour might change were subsidies to be abolished. Even so, the authors point to evidence suggesting the adaptability of agriculture to policy change. For instance, arable Netherlands reacted to decoupling of arable payments and reduction of EU sugar subsidies by growing more intensive crops such as potatoes, vegetables and flower bulbs and less cereals and sugar beet. The authors point out that European farms have long been consolidating into larger units, in response to technological change and market competition. Abolishing subsidies would speed up the existing process of ‘structural change’, says the report.

Finally, the report attempts to reach some conclusions about which kinds of farms are best-placed to weather the economic storm that would come with the abolition of subsidies. The report finds that farm size has a bearing on viability but it can work in different ways.

“The direction of this relationship differs between countries. In countries such as Germany, Latvia and Hungary larger farms tend to be less vital. In these countries the cooperative farms are an important reason for this. In other countries such as Belgium, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK larger farms tend to be more vital.”

The authors point out that the two main potential problems that would be caused by the abolition of current subsidy system – land abandonment and farm insolvency – could be addressed at less cost than at present with a more targeted approach. This is perhaps the most policy-relevant conclusion of the entire report.

Read: Farm viability in the European Union: Assessment of the impact of changes in farm payments