Great Britain went through a protectionist phase in agriculture after the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, lasting for three decades until the repeal of the Corn Law in 1846. In food-importing Great Britain, the interruption of trade through Napoleon’s Continental Blockade had driven up food prices and farmers resisted the subsequent resumption of trade in peacetime. But the historic roots of continental agricultural protectionism, I always thought, were somewhat more recent, namely the transport cost revolution of the second half of the 19th century. As it became economically efficient to transport grain by train from the US Midwest to the East Coast, and then by ship to Europe, agrarian interests defended the higher rents on scarcer European land against the international convergence of factor prices.

However, I stumbled upon an intriguing paragraph by Findlay and O’Rourke (Power and Plenty, p. 374) that dates some continental agrarian protectionism back to Napoleonic wars: ‘in 1811, faced with the growing scarcity of sugar, Napoleon issued a decree promoting beet cultivation through a variety of means, leading to a rapid growth in the number of factories. This new industry, which eventually spread to several other Northern Hemisphere countries, would soon become dependent on government subsidies and protection, since tropical producers retained important underlying cost advantages. Indeed, government production and export subsidies became so prevalent that in 1902 nine European countries … signed the first international primary commodity agreement, the Brussels Convention, which aimed at abolishing sugar subsidies. In this sector, therefore, war time import substitution had not only a long-run effect on subsequent trade policies, but also a large negative impact of tropical sugar producers, particularly from the 1870s onwards … Between 1860 and 1900, European countries increased their share of world trade in sugar from zero to 60%. … By 1902, free-market sugar prices had declined to little more than a third of their 1880 level.’

What an outstanding example of policies’ path dependence! There is a dangerous tendency in man to rationalize the past and call for continuity. Generally it feels better to say: ‘We have done what we had to do. Now times are changing and we need to adapt by building on what we have already achieved’, than to admit ‘We have seriously messed up in the past and now we need to start again with a clean slate.’ It would be preferable to be honest and concede that agricultural protectionism – including but also antedating the CAP – was a big mistake and that we need to move on to an entirely different policy targeting sustainable land use.

Another thought that comes to mind from this historical perspective: both causes of agricultural protectionism, from the early and late 19th century, are classical examples of special interests defending their rents to the detriment of collective welfare. The idea that agricultural subsidies/protectionism originated with the food shortages of the Second World War is clearly a myth. Whilst this experience facilitated the creation of the CAP, the real driving forces of the second half of the 20th century have remained the same as ever: the sectoral interest of agriculture.

The EU dairy market is now recovering from the severe drop in milk prices in 2009. Perhaps the clearest sign of this recovery is the setting of export refunds on dairy products to zero since mid-November, as world market prices for dairy products have strengthened in recent months.

It is thus an opportune time to evaluate the EU’s response to the crisis, and to see what lessons might be drawn for how the Union can address similar problems in other farm sectors in the future. My view is that there is a lot to be learned from the dairy crisis, and that the outgoing Commissioner deserves credit for the way she handled it.

EU milk prices improving

Let us first review the evidence that the milk market is improving. The trends in the EU market prices (proxied by the German price and represented by the blue line) and the EU intervention price (the red line) for butter and skim milk powder (SMP) have been graphed by CLAL.it and are reproduced below.

The German butter price is now back to the level of 2002 before the cuts in intervention prices. The recovery in SMP prices has not been as strong, but even so these are now comfortably above intervention levels. EU dairy farmers also benefit from an additional €5 billion per year in the form of direct payments (3.5c/kg milk) to compensate for the reductions in intervention prices.

Farm prices are responding to the better prices for dairy products, although with some lag. The average EU price for standardised 4.2% fat milk, according to the LTO, has risen to €27.06/100kg in October 2009 from its lowest point of €23.74/100kg in April. It is now back at the levels of Spring 2007, before the big run-up in prices in 2008.

The recent USDA market outlook for dairy products in 2010 foresees continued strong prices into 2010 as economic growth recovers particularly in developing countries. While the large stocks of SMP in particular overhanging the market are seen as a negative factor, it observes that in the US most of these stocks are committed for domestic food programmes and that the EU is unlikely to release its stocks on to the market soon for fear of the political fallout from producers.

The Commission’s response to the dairy crisis

Assuming that prices continue to strengthen throughout 2010, it is useful to review what lessons were learned for crisis management when faced with a substantial fall in the price of a farm commodity. The Union’s responses to the collapse in domestic milk prices in 2009 can be divided into market management measures and income support measures.

Among the market management measures were

In total, the Commission expects to spend up to €600 million on market measures this year.

Among the income support measures were:

Reflections on the Union’s response to the dairy crisis

A first observation to make is that, while the Commission did resort to market management measures such as intervention and export subsidies, much more emphasis on this occasion was put on income support measures.

It was noticeable that the Commissioner firmly set her face against any increase, even temporarily, in intervention prices and against a reduction in quotas, arguing that both would be against the spirit of the Health Check intended to move the CAP in a more market-oriented direction.

Although the future of export refunds after 2013 is uncertain (the EU has committed to their elimination but only in the context of a successful outcome of the Doha Round in which similar disciplines applied to other forms of export support), it is likely that the greater emphasis on direct income support measures in response to crisis is here to stay. While the loud voices calling for stronger support measures as part of a food security policy for Europe would doubtless like to see stronger market management measures, these are effectively beggar-my-neighbour responses unless undertaken as part of a global framework (e.g. a global stocks policy).

A second observation is that the income support measures included both a relaxation of state aid restrictions (allowing Member States to fund payments to producers) and a Community scheme. While the national state aids were permitted only in the context of a measure taken as part of a wider response to the economic crisis, they do flag a possible direction for future responses to agricultural market crises. When the figures come in, it will be interesting to assess how much use the individual Member States make of this opportunity.

A third observation is that the payments will be made to producers only with a lag (the exception is the speeding up of the disbursement of the standard Single Farm Payment). This means that payments will reach farmers after the crisis has passed and when incomes are already recovering. Clearly, payments should reach farmers at the time when they are most needed, and hopefully the decision to allow the Commission to respond to future dairy market crises on its own initiative may facilitate this in future.

A fourth observation is that there is now little headroom in the EU budget up to 2013 to fund unexpected crisis management measures. The outgoing Commissioner has made clear that funding the €300m emergency aid from the 2010 budget has utilised any remaining headroom and, apart from the use of the safety margin, any further call on the agricultural budget would trigger the financial discipline mechanism requiring a cut in direct payments.

Price volatility on agricultural markets is expected to increase in future (though whether this is a reasonable presumption to make deserves further analysis, and the outcome depends on the interaction between production shocks and their distribution where climate change is expected to increase volatility, trade policies and their implications for price transmission from world to national markets, and government behaviour particularly with reference to stocks).

Presumably these lessons will be analysed by the High Level Experts’ Group on Milk which is looking into the medium and long-term future of the dairy sector and which will deliver its final report by the end of June 2010. A very useful input is the report on price volatility in the dairy sector commissioned by the European Dairy Association and written by my Irish colleagues Michael Keane and Declan O’Connor.

The 2009 EU dairy market crisis was handled well by the outgoing Commissioner. There was no back-tracking in the direction of CAP reform, and a number of innovative new instruments to address income volatility in a particular sector are being tested. The lessons learned from this experience will be an important input into the discussions on the shape of the CAP post-2013.

Update 5 January 2010: When writing this post, I had not seen that the French have made use of the national state aid provision to provide up to €700 million to farmers affected by the crisis. Aid under this new scheme can be granted until 31 December 2010 and will take the form of direct grants, interest rate subsidies, subsidised loans as well as aid towards the payment of social security contributions. See http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1866&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en,

When the negotiators in the Uruguay Round of the GATT introduced the concept of the ‘green box’ – farm support measures that are minimally or non-trade distorting and therefore exempt from any limits – few would have foreseen that within 15 years, the bulk of farm support in the developed world would be in the green box. A new book “Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Green Box: Ensuring Coherence with Sustainable Development Goals”, published by Cambridge University Press, shows the extent to which farm support has been shifted out of more traditional, trade distorting measures and into the green box. It addresses the vexed question of whether green box supports are really as trade-neutral and environmentally beneficial as they are claimed to be. [...]

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The resort to intervention buying and export refunds in the dairy sector has been predictably bad PR for the EU, especially in the southern hemisphere. But a more fundamental question is, can these tired old policy instruments work any magic in a deep economic crisis? [...]

It was the recession of the 1930s that ushered in agricultural protectionism and subsidies, not least in the United States. Now the European Union has reverted to two of its old favourite policy instruments: intervention buying and export subsidies in the dairy sector just when we thought we had seen the last of them. Stocks of butter disappeared completely in 2007.

Faced with a drastic drop in dairy prices, the EU is to buy 30,000 tons of butter at a guaranteed price. Over three times as much skimmed milk powder is to be purchased – 109,000 tons. In addition, export subsidies will be given to skimmed milk powder, butter, butter oil and cheese. These subsidies are, of course, particularly damaging to developing countries where they undermine the viability of local farmers. As Oxfam has pointed out, once the EU starts using them, other countries may follow suit.
[...]

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[...]

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