World food prices are on the rise again. In December 2010, they exceeded the dramatic peak they had reached during the global food crisis in 2007/08. Add to this threatening megatrends, such as population growth and climate change, and think of recent news about the severe drought in Russia or the once-in-a-century flooding in Australia, both major staple food exporters. Who wouldn’t get an uneasy feeling that the specter of famine might come to haunt Europe again?

The European Commission has concluded in its communication on the post-2013 CAP that the CAP must preserve the EU’s food production potential, ‘so as to guarantee long-term food security for European citizens’. Similarly, ministers of agriculture from 22 member states claim in their Paris Declaration that ‘only an ambitious, continent-wide policy can safeguard Europe’s independence’.

Surprisingly, however, there are no scenarios and no calculations to substantiate this perceived threat. Only the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) has conducted a Food Security Assessment. The lessons are clear-cut: there are no discernible dangers for the UK. In a recent working paper, I have looked at the entire EU.

EU food production per capita has constantly increased in the past and far outstrips dietary energy requirements. The share of income that households spend on food has steadily declined. By now, food prices are so low compared to income that even a 10-fold increase in the farm gate price of staple crops would be far off from provoking food scarcity in the EU. Forecasts predict roughly stable or increasing production quantities for the EU – even in the case of subsidy and tariff cuts. The expected main effect of climate change during the coming decades will be to shift production from southern to northern Europe without significantly curtailing overall production.

If food prices rose dramatically, the EU could increase the agricultural area used for growing cereals; in particular, by cutting back on biofuel and livestock production. Furthermore, agricultural labor and capital input could be multiplied. An additional measure would be to enhance investments into agricultural productivity.

The EU does thus not depend on imports for its food security. Still, it’s interesting to have a closer look at EU food imports. Since food prices are so low compared with EU wealth that the EU could afford sufficient imports even if prices rose tenfold (always speaking of basic staples, not caviar and passion fruit), only export restrictions could impair the EU’s import potential. A number of considerations show how unlikely this threat is.

Agricultural markets are becoming thicker: world food trade has increased by 230% between 2000 and 2008 according to the FAO. The greater the volumes, the more food can still be bought on the world market if a given amount of supplies is interrupted.

Export concentration has been low, or at least decreasing, during recent decades in the most important agricultural markets, as Defra notes in its Food Security Assessment. The concentration of countries’ share in world food exports matters because export restrictions are more lucrative and can be more easily upheld if most of the market is in the hands of one or few suppliers.

A significant share of EU imports comes from highly reliable exporters: the US, Switzerland, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. These countries could greatly expand their exports to the EU if the need arose. The other main source of exports to the EU, South America, is decently stable. The figure below shows the market shares of key exporters to the EU (it stems, as the following figures, from the DG Agri MAP newsletter).

Food is a homogenous good if the issue is not taste but calories. If exports of wheat were seriously curtailed, they could be replaced by rice, maize and other grains. Export restrictions are therefore less harmful to importers and less attractive to exporters.

Food is mostly traded on a spot market and can be easily transported. Food thus differs greatly from oil and gas where imports hinge on long-term contracts, pipelines and suitable refineries.

Food production in major exporting countries can be more easily increased than energy production (beyond currently available capacity) as the latter depends on long-term capital investments. If some suppliers restrict their exports, it is thus easier for their competitors to pick up market shares.

No prolonged and encompassing phases of export restrictions have occurred since the Second World War. Export restrictions taken during the 2007/08 price spikes were usually of short duration and limited to one or a few products.

The EU imports relatively little staple food. Most agricultural imports are either feedstuff (soya), ‘luxury’ products (coffee, tea, tobacco, sugar, exotic fruits, meat, food preparations) or products with multiple non-food uses (palm oil). The figures below show this at a highly aggregated level and for the main imported products.

All readers are cordially invited to discuss these issues at a lunch seminar at ECIPE in Brussels on January 26.

This week the governments of France and Germany have published a short document setting out their common position on the future of the common agricultural policy. It makes for fairly light reading though the following points are worth remarking on:

- The common position endorses further moves towards greater market orientation in the CAP but suggests countervailing measures are needed “to buffer devastating effects of growing price volatility and market crises”.

- There is nothing concrete on the future budget of the CAP and it is stressed that “a final decision on all questions relating to finances will be made when decisions are made on all policies and the entire EU financial framework”. In other words, there is not going to be another stitch-up like the Chirac-Schroeder deal of 2002 which effectively fixed the CAP budget for the next 11 years, short-circuiting the normal EU budget-setting processes.

- The two pillar structure of the CAP should be maintained, and no national co-financing should be required of pillar one expenditure (i.e. direct payments and market measures). This is something of a surprise, coming as it does from Germany, the major net contributor to the CAP and France, that is soon to become a net contributor. Co-financing is one way for net contributor countries to improve their budget balances.

- Once the budgets of the two pillars have been decided, there should be no need for modulation of funds between the pillars.

- While new measures may be needed to meet new challenges and objectives, these must “take very carefully into account the financial implications for each Member State.”

- It is argued that “EU standards must be met by all imported products” though it is not clear whether this relates to methods of production or EU sanitary and phytosanitary standards, which imports must meet already.

- The common position states that “In some sectors we need more transparency and more market power for the producer” and suggests some methods by which this could be achieved.

- “Decoupled payments have to remain central in any future system.” The common position argues that “direct payments provide remuneration for public goods that are not rewarded by the market, cover production cost caused by higher production standards desired by society and they contribute to the income of farmers and are an essential part of the risk reducing safety net for European agriculture”. France and Germany reject “EU-wide flat rate” for direct payments and argue that direct payment rates are to be set with regard to net budget positions of member states. Effectively, this is France and Germany saying they don’t want to pay any more for direct payments to Polish and Romanian farmers.

- Member states should investigate, on a voluntary basis, insurance and mutual funds, as a method for stabilising farm incomes over time.

- The countries support greater national flexibility in rural development policies and in “distribution of direct payments within a Member State”.

What should we make of the common position? It reads rather as though France’s main priority is to secure its own position on the CAP, which is to preserve the status quo with the addition of measures of the kind that were introduced as emergency measures during last year’s milk price crash. Germany, which also has concerns about price volatility, is additionally looking to constrain the CAP budget (and the EU budget more widely) and protect its national budgetary position.

The 5-page document can be downloaded from here (PDF).

Farm interests routinely threaten that any reduction in support will provoke a slump in production, endangering EU food security, and threatening massive land abandonment to the detriment of rural life and biodiversity. The findings of the Scenar 2020-II – Update of scenario study on agriculture and the rural world, commissioned by DG Agri, strongly contradict such panicmongering about the looming end of EU agriculture.

The study looks at three scenarios. The reference case assumes a 20% (nominal) CAP budget reduction, reduced intervention stocks, full decoupling, a 30% direct payment reduction, a 105% increase for the second pillar, and a moderate Doha agreement (based on the Falconer paper, including the elimination of export subsidies). The conservative scenario presumes that the Health Check results are largely maintained, direct payments reduced by only 15% and second pillar payments raised by 45%. The liberal scenario is very liberal indeed, with a 55% CAP budget reduction, no intervention stocks, no direct payments, a 100% increase for the second pillar and no tariffs.

Among the most interesting results is that the volume of crop production will grow slowly in all scenarios (around 0.25% per year). Even the vulnerable livestock sector loses only 4% in the liberal scenario over the entire 2007-2020 period. Agricultural land use remains roughly unchanged in the reference and conservative scenarios, and declines by a mere 6% in the liberal scenario (due to the decline in the EU-15, driven mostly by the abolition of the Single Farm Payment).

More significant differences arise when it comes to land prices. These remain largely unchanged in the reference and conservative cases, but decrease by 30% in the liberal scenario. This is nothing the public need worry about – but it explains the heavy lobbying of landowners for the preservation of a ‘strong’ CAP.

The study also analyzes the situation of rural regions. It concludes that strong rurality is not synonymous with negative economic or demographic trends. 422 regions have a negative and 435 regions a positive demographic trend (with negative developments in the eastern Member States and at the southern and northern borders of the EU). The study also finds that ‘There is no evidence that the EU-27 regions with an above average agricultural employment are generally showing negative reactions. Hence, it shall be emphasised that rurality and agricultural vocation are not a sign of weak development perspectives.’ This further undermines the rural development approach of the CAP that spreads money to all rural regions, often in positive correlation with their agricultural production.

A last point to consider: surveys of life satisfaction and happiness give very similar results for urban and rural areas. Since ‘happiness’ is in vogue (and heads of states from Bhutan to France argue for happiness accounting to complement GDP figures), why worry if rural regions have a lower GDP per capita, so long as people there are equally satisfied?

The EU dairy market is now recovering from the severe drop in milk prices in 2009. Perhaps the clearest sign of this recovery is the setting of export refunds on dairy products to zero since mid-November, as world market prices for dairy products have strengthened in recent months.

It is thus an opportune time to evaluate the EU’s response to the crisis, and to see what lessons might be drawn for how the Union can address similar problems in other farm sectors in the future. My view is that there is a lot to be learned from the dairy crisis, and that the outgoing Commissioner deserves credit for the way she handled it.

EU milk prices improving

Let us first review the evidence that the milk market is improving. The trends in the EU market prices (proxied by the German price and represented by the blue line) and the EU intervention price (the red line) for butter and skim milk powder (SMP) have been graphed by CLAL.it and are reproduced below.

The German butter price is now back to the level of 2002 before the cuts in intervention prices. The recovery in SMP prices has not been as strong, but even so these are now comfortably above intervention levels. EU dairy farmers also benefit from an additional €5 billion per year in the form of direct payments (3.5c/kg milk) to compensate for the reductions in intervention prices.

Farm prices are responding to the better prices for dairy products, although with some lag. The average EU price for standardised 4.2% fat milk, according to the LTO, has risen to €27.06/100kg in October 2009 from its lowest point of €23.74/100kg in April. It is now back at the levels of Spring 2007, before the big run-up in prices in 2008.

The recent USDA market outlook for dairy products in 2010 foresees continued strong prices into 2010 as economic growth recovers particularly in developing countries. While the large stocks of SMP in particular overhanging the market are seen as a negative factor, it observes that in the US most of these stocks are committed for domestic food programmes and that the EU is unlikely to release its stocks on to the market soon for fear of the political fallout from producers.

The Commission’s response to the dairy crisis

Assuming that prices continue to strengthen throughout 2010, it is useful to review what lessons were learned for crisis management when faced with a substantial fall in the price of a farm commodity. The Union’s responses to the collapse in domestic milk prices in 2009 can be divided into market management measures and income support measures.

Among the market management measures were

In total, the Commission expects to spend up to €600 million on market measures this year.

Among the income support measures were:

Reflections on the Union’s response to the dairy crisis

A first observation to make is that, while the Commission did resort to market management measures such as intervention and export subsidies, much more emphasis on this occasion was put on income support measures.

It was noticeable that the Commissioner firmly set her face against any increase, even temporarily, in intervention prices and against a reduction in quotas, arguing that both would be against the spirit of the Health Check intended to move the CAP in a more market-oriented direction.

Although the future of export refunds after 2013 is uncertain (the EU has committed to their elimination but only in the context of a successful outcome of the Doha Round in which similar disciplines applied to other forms of export support), it is likely that the greater emphasis on direct income support measures in response to crisis is here to stay. While the loud voices calling for stronger support measures as part of a food security policy for Europe would doubtless like to see stronger market management measures, these are effectively beggar-my-neighbour responses unless undertaken as part of a global framework (e.g. a global stocks policy).

A second observation is that the income support measures included both a relaxation of state aid restrictions (allowing Member States to fund payments to producers) and a Community scheme. While the national state aids were permitted only in the context of a measure taken as part of a wider response to the economic crisis, they do flag a possible direction for future responses to agricultural market crises. When the figures come in, it will be interesting to assess how much use the individual Member States make of this opportunity.

A third observation is that the payments will be made to producers only with a lag (the exception is the speeding up of the disbursement of the standard Single Farm Payment). This means that payments will reach farmers after the crisis has passed and when incomes are already recovering. Clearly, payments should reach farmers at the time when they are most needed, and hopefully the decision to allow the Commission to respond to future dairy market crises on its own initiative may facilitate this in future.

A fourth observation is that there is now little headroom in the EU budget up to 2013 to fund unexpected crisis management measures. The outgoing Commissioner has made clear that funding the €300m emergency aid from the 2010 budget has utilised any remaining headroom and, apart from the use of the safety margin, any further call on the agricultural budget would trigger the financial discipline mechanism requiring a cut in direct payments.

Price volatility on agricultural markets is expected to increase in future (though whether this is a reasonable presumption to make deserves further analysis, and the outcome depends on the interaction between production shocks and their distribution where climate change is expected to increase volatility, trade policies and their implications for price transmission from world to national markets, and government behaviour particularly with reference to stocks).

Presumably these lessons will be analysed by the High Level Experts’ Group on Milk which is looking into the medium and long-term future of the dairy sector and which will deliver its final report by the end of June 2010. A very useful input is the report on price volatility in the dairy sector commissioned by the European Dairy Association and written by my Irish colleagues Michael Keane and Declan O’Connor.

The 2009 EU dairy market crisis was handled well by the outgoing Commissioner. There was no back-tracking in the direction of CAP reform, and a number of innovative new instruments to address income volatility in a particular sector are being tested. The lessons learned from this experience will be an important input into the discussions on the shape of the CAP post-2013.

Update 5 January 2010: When writing this post, I had not seen that the French have made use of the national state aid provision to provide up to €700 million to farmers affected by the crisis. Aid under this new scheme can be granted until 31 December 2010 and will take the form of direct grants, interest rate subsidies, subsidised loans as well as aid towards the payment of social security contributions. See http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1866&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en,

Following the recent interest in food price developments, DG AGRI has now released long-term monthly price data for a wide range of farm and first-stage processed products from its AGRIVIEW database. AGRIVIEW is a data warehouse providing a common repository for integrated data for DG AGRI which is normally only available to internal Commission analysts. For example, it includes financial information, market prices, tariff data, and data on export refunds. The market price data on a monthly basis from January 1997 until the most recent date, for both the EU on average and for individual member states, is now available for download as a 7MB Excel file from the DG AGRI website. Unlike Eurostat information which is supplied by national statistical offices, the AGRIVIEW price information comes from the agriculture ministries in Member States. The data are presented in tabular format as well as in attractively formatted charts. A nice Christmas present for those who like messing with figures…..

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